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CUSTODIAL POLICE INTERROGATION IN OUR 
NATION'S CAPITAL: THE ATTEMPT 
TO IMPLEMENT MIRANDAt 
Richard]. Medalie, * Leonard Zeitz,** and Paul Alexander*** 
I. TESTING THE PREMISES OF MIRANDA 
IN his attempt to define the meaning of democracy, Carl Becker, looking back to Plato's view of society, observed that "[a]ll human 
institutions, we are told, have their ideal forms laid away in heaven, 
and we do not need to be told that the actual institutions conform 
but indifferently to these ideal counterparts."1 Becker's observation 
may well set the perspective from which to view what occurred when 
the attempt was made in the District of Columbia to implement the 
Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.2 
A. The Miranda Premises 
In lvI iranda, the Court's aim was to devise proper safeguards which 
would preclude custodial police interrogation practices designed to 
impair a defendant's capacity to remain silent.3 Once a suspect in 
custody was to be questioned by police, he would have to be "ade-
quately and effectively apprised of his rights" and assured of "a con-
t The research for this Article was conducted in a project of the Institute of Crim-
inal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center, under a grant from the 
Ford Foundation. The authors are greatly indebted to Samuel Dash, Director of the 
Institute, who provided helpful guidance and direction to the research throughout the 
course of the project and who contributed many useful suggestions during the writing 
of this Article. Other credits are set out in note 10 infra. 
• Deputy Director, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, member of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and New York Bars. B.A. 1952, University of Minnesota; A.M. 1955, 
LL.B. 1958, Harvard University.-Ed. 
•• Research Sociologist, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure. B.A. 1957, 
Brooklyn College; M.A. 1959, Columbia University.-Ed. 
• .. Research Fellow, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, member of the 
District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1964, Ohio State University; J.D. 1967, Georgetown Uni-
versity. 
1. C. BECKER, MODERN DEMOCRACY 5 (1941). 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. See Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 199, 200 (1966). Custodial interrogation was defined by the 
Court to mean "questioning intiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court avowed that in-custody 
interrogation contained "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine 
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak when he would not otherwise 
do so freely." 384 U.S. at 467. For convenience, the term "defendant" in this article is 
used interchangeably with the terms "suspect," "accused," and "offender." 
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tinuous opportunity to exercise them."4 To this end, the police were 
to warn the suspect "in clear and unequivocal terms" 
-that he had the right to remain silent;5 
-that anything said "can and will" be used against the individual 
in court;6 
-that he had not only the right to consult with counsel prior 
to questioning, but also the right to have counsel present at the 
interrogation;7 
-that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed 
for him prior to any questioning if the defendant so desired.8 
At least three related premises seemed to underlie the Court's 
decision: (I) that the police will give adequate and effective warnings 
of legal rights and will honor the accused's exercise of those rights; 
(2) that the defendant will understand the meaning of the warnings 
and their significance in application to himself and that he will 
thereby have sufficient basis to decide in his own best interest 
whether or not to remain silent and whether or not to request coun-
sel; and (3) that the presence of an attorney in the police station will 
protect the accused's fifth amendment privilege. 
B. The Nature of the Present Study 
In order to test these premises, the Institute of Criminal Law 
and Procedure of the Georgetown University Law Center9 undertook 
an empirical study of the attempt to implement Miranda in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.10 In contrast to other studies which have con-
4. 384 U.S. at 467. 
5. 384 U.S. at 467-68. 
6. 384 U.S. at 469. 
7. 384 U.S. at 471. 
8. 384 U.S. at 479. The Court acknowledged that "the defendant may waive effectua-
tion of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Like• 
wise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be 
interrogated, the police may not question him." 384 U.S. at 444-45. The Court concluded 
that "unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution 
at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." 384 
U.S. at 479. 
9. The Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure was established in October 1965 
under a grant from the Ford Foundation, at the Georgetown University Law Center. 
The staff of the Institute is composed of attorneys and research associates from other 
disciplines, including sociology, psychiatry, psychology, social work, forensic science, 
history, and political science. The primary aim of the Institute is to engage in system-
atic studies of the criminal law process from police investigation practices to appellate 
and post-conviction procedures. 
IO. See Dash, Foreword, in R. MEDALIE, FROM EsCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANAT-
OMY OF A SUl'REME COURT DECISION xix (1966). 
For their excellent cooperation, we are grateful to Julian Dugas, then Director, and 
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centrated on the police and law enforcement, 11 the Institute con-
cerned itself primarily with the effect of Miranda on the role played 
by defense counsel at the station house and on the defendant's per-
ception of his legal rights. Moreover, unlike other studies which ob-
tained data by stationing observers with the police,12 the Institute 
Lorenzo Jacobs, then Deputy Director, Neighborhood Legal Services Project; Joseph F. 
Hennessey and Lawrence J. Bernard, Jr., Junior Bar Section (now Young Lawyer's Sec-
tion) of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, who together with Messrs. 
Dugas and Jacobs were co-chairmen of the Precinct Representation Project; Kenneth 
L. Wood, Director, and Addison M. Bowman III, then Deputy Director, Legal Aid 
Agency of the District of Columbia; and Professor William "\V. Greenhalgh, Co-Director, 
Legal Intern (Prettyman Fellowship) Program, Georgetown University Law Center, as 
well as to the attorneys on their respective staffs who gave so fully of their valuable 
time, as did many other members of the District of Columbia Bar. Professor A. Ken-
neth Pye, Duke Law School, then Assistant Dean, Georgetown University Law Center, 
was helpful during the initial formulation of the project. Professors Arnold Enker, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School, and Yale Kamisar, University of Michigan Law School, 
Mrs. Patricia ·wald, Member, President's Commission on Crime in the District of 
Columbia, and many others suggested useful revisions in the manuscript of this article. 
Dr. Leonard H. Goodman, Senior Research Associate, Bureau of Social Science Re-
search, Inc., and Dr. John Vincent, Research Sociologist, Institute of Criminal Law 
and Procedure, offered helpful criticism of the research methodology employed. 
In addition to the authors, who served as Director, Research Director, and Assistant 
Field Director of the research study, the following people-most of whom were law and 
graduate students at the various universities in the District of Columbia-worked long 
and hard to make this research study possible: Field Director-Brian Paddock; Assistant 
Field Director-John "\V. Hempelmann; Interviewers and Research Staff-Inez N. At-
well, "Wilbur M. Atwell, Sheldon Berman, Bruce L. Bozeman, Vernida J. Davis, Andrew 
F. Dempsey, Paul E. Fitzhenry, Sherry E. Gendelman, Naomi F. Hartwick, Otto J. 
Koenig, Paula Manning, George J. Martin, John Mills, and John Nader; Research As-
sistant-Joel Blumenfield; Coding Supervisor-Rita Mattox; Computer Assistants-
Lawrence Berman and Tom Hogan. Finally, our appreciation is due to our secretarial 
assistants-Sandra Calloway, Carol Ann Hayter, Jacqueline Holt, Janet Johnstone, 
Charlotte Sandy, and Virginia Sponsler. 
11. These studies analyzed police interrogation procedures in the following cities: 
(I) Boston, Chicago, and ·washington, D.C.: Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the Crim-
inal Process, ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PoL. & Soc. Ser., Nov. 1967, at 47; see also 
Black &: Reiss, Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions, in 2 PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FIELD SURVEY III-
STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT IN :MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAs 1 (Reiss ed. 
1967). (2) Detroit: V. Piersante, Confession in Felony Prosecutions for the Year of 1961 
as Compared to Jan. 20, 1965, through Dec. 31, 1965 (unpublished manuscript, July 27, 
1965); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1966, at 18, col. 1. (3) Los Angeles: E. Younger, Results 
of Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's Office of Los Angeles County Regarding 
the Effects of the Dorado and Miranda Decisions upon the Prosecution of Felony Cases, 
Aug. 4, 1966. See also Younger, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on 
Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 255 (1966). (4) New Haven: Interrogation in 
New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). See also Griffiths &: 
Ayres, A Postcript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE 
L.J. 300 (1967). (5) New York: Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confes-
sions: A Legal Perspective-A Practical Perspective, 154 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1965). See also N. 
SonEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS 136-39 (1966). (6) Pittsburgh: Seeburger &: Wet-
tick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1967). For a 
critique of the Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York studies, see Interrogation in New 
Haven, supra, at 1639-43. 
12. See, e.g., Reiss & Black, supra note 11, at 51-52; Interrogation in New Haven, 
supra note 11, at 1527-28, 1637-38. Although we attempted to conduct a similar observa-
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obtained its data primarily through questionnaires administered 
to attorneys who had volunteered their time to service defendants 
at the station house in a year-long "Precinct Representation Project," 
and through interviews with defendants in the Institute's Defendant 
Interview Study. To the extent permitted by the available data 
obtained from the attorneys and defendants, police warning and 
interrogation practices were also analyzed. 
I. The Precinct Representation Project 
As an interim effort to implement the Supreme Court's guide-
lines in Miranda, the Junior Bar Section of the Bar Association of 
the District of Columbia and the Neighborhood Legal Services 
Project (NLSP) of the United Planning Organization (the local 
antipoverty agency) conducted a Precinct Representation Project 
in the District from June 28, 1966, until June 27, 1967. The 
Project was unique in its efforts to provide volunteer attorneys 
around the clock to defendants at the police station. Other groups, 
including the D.C. Bar Association, the Washington Bar Association, 
and the Legal Intern Program of the Georgetown University Law 
Center,18 also participated in the Project.14 With the exception of 
the legal interns and certain individual practitioners, the volunteer 
attorneys were in full-time civil practice with little or no experience 
in criminal law other than that derived from the occasional criminal 
cases to which they had been appointed by the courts. 
Whenever an accused at a precinct police station desired counsel 
but had no counsel of his own, the police were to place a call to a 
central switchboard manned by NLSP personnel twenty-four hours 
a day. The switchboard operator was then to notify the volunteer 
attorney on duty to go to the appropriate police precinct to represent 
the accused. Generally, defendants did not obtain counsel at the 
station house from any other source. 
tion study of the police in the District of Columbia, we were unable to work out satis-
factory arrangements with the Metropolitan Police Department. 
13. Begun in 1960, the Legal Internship Program provides a number of fellowships 
at the Georgetown University Graduate School of Law. In addition to following a 
graduate program of study and research, the Legal Interns represent indigent defen-
dants in actual cases. See Pye, Legal Internships: Georgetown's Experiment in Legal 
Education, 49 A.B.A.J. 554 (1963). 
14. "[O]n June 28, 1966, more than 40 members of the Junior Bar Section, together 
with approximately 35 attorneys from the Neighborhood Legal Services Project, ap-
proximately 20 attorneys from the Washington Bar Association, and six attorneys from 
the Legal Intern Program at Georgetown Law Center began participating in an in-
terim program •..• " J. Hennessey &: L. Bernard, Memorandum to Attorneys Par• 
ticipating in the Miranda Project, July 13, 1966, at 1, in Junior Bar Section, Miranda 
Kit, July 18, 1966. (The Miranda Kit is available for inspection in Michigan Law Re• 
view files.) 
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NLSP attorneys and Georgetown legal interns provided counsel 
to the precincts between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. on Monday through 
Friday, while volunteer attorneys from the various bar associations 
manned the stations between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. and during 
the weekend daytime hours.15 All told, approximately 180 volunteer 
attorneys participated in the Project. 
In order to evaluate this attempt to implement Miranda, the 
Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure arranged with NLSP and 
the Junior Bar Section to obtain complete access to all the Project's 
records for the entire life of the Project. 
2. The Defendant Interview Study 
To assess the impact of Miranda on the defendant directly, the 
Institute devised its Defendant Interview Study. The Institute staff 
conducted interviews with 260 persons16 who had been subjected to 
arrest procedures in the District of Columbia during 1965 and 1966.17 
The interview schedule was designed to gather a wide variety 
of data concerning (1) the defendant's reaction to actual and hypo-
thetical arrest situations; (2) his attitudes toward the adversary sys-
tem, the assistance of counsel, and police investigative practices; 
(3) his perception of constitutional and other legal rights coincident 
to arrest and initial presentment; (4) his awareness of judicial de-
cisions defining those rights; and (5) his knowledge and understand-
ing of the criminal law process itself.18 
C. The Central Findings 
Two central findings stand out in our study. First, approximately 
40 per cent of the defendants in our study who were arrested in 
15. The description of the Precinct Representation Project is drawn from Miranda 
Kit 1-3. The Institute was given complete access to all Project records for its entire life. 
16. Because of the difficulty in standardizing the circumstances of the interviews, 
we found it necessary to interview the 260 defendants at all stages of the legal process, 
from arrest through release or incarceration, and in places ranging from private homes 
to the various penal institutions in the Washington area. 
17. The Defendant Interview Study was part of a larger study which included inter-
views with a sample of over 750 nonoffenders and former offenders representing one 
tenth of one per cent of the general population in the District of Columbia. The re-
sults of this separate study will be reported in subsequent articles. 
18. The Defendant Interview Schedule was pretested in two District of Columbia 
census tracts-one of high socioeconomic status and one of low socioeconomic status-
and at the D.C. jail. On the basis of the pretest, as with all such instruments, some 
questions were found to be useless, many required modification and revision, and many 
new questions were inserted. In its completed form, the interview schedule was an 
instrument that required an average of one hour to administer. While interviews were 
still in progress, staff members began coding the data. ·when coding was completed, 
the data were keypunched and transferred to IBM cards. The material, both in fre-
quency distributions and in cross-tabulations, was thereafter computed at the George-
town University Computer Center. A portion of the schedule is set out in Appendix 
C infra. 
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the post-Miranda period stated that they had given statements19 to 
the police.20 Second, an astonishingly small number of defendants-
1,262-requested counsel from the Precinct Representation Project, 
even though volunteer attorneys were readily available around the 
clock, seven days a week.21 This number represented only 7 per 
cent22 of the 15,430 persons arrested for felonies and serious mis-
demeanors in the District of Columbia during fiscal 1967.23 
These central findings bring into question the three basic 
premises of Miranda. To assess their significance, we shall first ex-
amine the defendants' perceptions of specific police practices under 
19. As in Miranda, the term "statements" includes for purposes of the present study 
"statements which are direct confessions ... statements which amount to 'admissions' 
of part or all of an offense ••• inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be 
merely 'exculpatory.'" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966). In addition, 
for the sake of completeness, unrelated and uncharacterized statements are included 
in the definition and will be noted, where relevant. 
20. A slightly higher percentage of defendants in our study who were arrested be-
fore Miranda also gave statements to the police. For the detailed findings see table E-1, 
Appendix E, infra. Of the 128 statements given by defendants who ultimately obtained 
counsel from the Precinct Representation Project, forty-three (34%) were inculpatory, 
fifty (39%) were exculpatory, and thirty-four (27%) were unrelated or uncharacterized. 
The remaining one could not be determined. The rate of statements given by this 
group of defendants varied with the crime charged, from a high of 80% for auto theft 
and 62% for larceny-theft to a low of 25% for weapons offenses. The rate of statements 
given for each class of crime category is set out in table E-2, Appendix E, infra. See 
generally Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 11, at 1552-53, 1566 n.123, 1567. 
21. After the first month of operation of the Project, Julian Dugas, then head of the 
NLSP found it "incredible" that his attorneys had received so few calls. As he observed, 
"(S]ince the free legal service was organized .•. only 78 defendants have taken advan-
tage of it. It seems extraordinary-in fact, it seems incredible-in light of the number 
of serious offenses committed each day in Washington." Washington Post, July 20, 1966, 
at C-1, col. 1. 
22. It does not follow from this statistic that the remaining 93% of the defendants 
were deprived of their constitutional rights as defined by Miranda. Not all of those 
arrested were subjected to interrogation, much less custodial interrogation which is the 
focus of Miranda. In their study of field interrogation, Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Donald 
J. Black pointed out that interrogation did not take place in 54% of the Part I and 
Part II bookings. Reiss & Black, supra note 11, at 54. Using that figure to cut the ar-
rest base to obtain only arrests in which interrogation took place, we would still only 
have 13% of the defendants who should have requested counsel. But this adjustment is 
not really proper, because, as we shall see in part III.B.2. infra, only about half of 
those who obtained counsel were in fact interrogated. The police were therefore not 
constitutionally required to offer the remaining defendants the option of counsel. Con-
sequently, a proper adjustment would require us to cut the base of defendants re-
questing counsel by half as well as cut the arrest base by 54%, By doing so, however, 
we end up with 9%-close to the 7% rate of lawyer requests we originally obtained. 
23. If all 73,492 nontraffic offenses are considered, the rate of those requesting 
counsel is only 2%, As might have been expected, the rate of calls for lawyers from the 
Precinct Representation Project was higher for persons charged with more serious of-
fenses; it was nevertheless extremely low considering the seriousness of the offense. 
For example, of the 185 persons arrested for homicide during the fiscal year studied, 
only thirty-one (17%) made a telephone request for counsel. Similarly, only 9% of the 
189 arrested for robbery, and 16% of the eighty-nine arrested for violating the drug 
laws requested counsel. A breakdown of requests for counsel according to the crime 
charged is set forth in tables E-3(1) & (2), Appendix E, infra. 
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Miranda-the types of warnings given, the nature of interrogation 
of the defendants, and the types of statements elicited. We shall then 
explore the reaction of the defendants to the Miranda warnings-
their understanding of the warnings, their attitudes toward the 
warnings, and their reasons for deciding whether or not to obtain 
counsel and whether or not to cooperate with the police. Finally, we 
shall evaluate the role of the attorneys at the station house-the 
nature and effect of the time delays before the attorneys saw the de-
fendants at the station, the types of services the attorneys performed, 
and the significance of their presence at the police station. 
Before getting to findings and conclusions, however, it seems 
appropriate to begin with a description and analysis of our research 
methodology in order that the validity of our data may be properly 
assessed. 
II. SOURCES OF DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. The Samples 
We obtained data for the present study from three sources: the 
Telephone Log Records24 and Volunteer Attorney Reports25 of the 
Precinct Representation Project and the Defendant Interview Sched-
ules26 of the Institute's Defendant Interview Study. 
During the year-long post-Miranda period of the Precinct Repre-
24. A Telephone Log Record form is reprinted in Appendix A infra. The Tele-
phone Log Records were coded and tabulated by IBM equipment for the following 
items: the date; day of week; time of call; precinct; nature of most serious crimes 
charged; identity of attorney; time lapse betlveen receipt of request by NLSP and 
contact with the attorney; and the number of defendants involved in the case. 
25. A Volunteer Attorney Report form is reprinted in Appendix B infra. The 
Volunteer Attorney Reports were coded and tabulated by IBM equipment for 
the following data: the date; day of week; time of arrest; time between arrest and ar-
rival of attorney; whether the attorney spoke to the defendant by telephone before he 
arrived at the station; time interval between arrival at the station house and the be-
ginning of the attorney-client interview; time spent in the attorney-client interview; 
precinct; whether police admitted questioning defendant; whether defendant claimed 
to have been warned or interrogated prior to the arrival of the attorney; whether the 
defendant made statements during questioning prior to the attorney's arrival; the 
nature of the interrogation that occurred in the attorney's presence; whether the de-
fendant made statements after the attorney offered advice; the nature of the attorney's 
advice and assistance; police reaction to the attorney as perceived by the attorney; the 
number of telephone calls the attorney made; whether the attorney maintained an 
interest in the case after initial contact; and other incidental data. 
26. The most comprehensive part of the Defendant Interview Schedule related to 
the arrest situation. As an indication of its specificity, the battery ran up to as many 
as eighty-eight questions, depending upon the unique circumstances in which the re-
spondent found himself. Along with the precoded responses, verbatim statements were 
elicited and recorded. Included in the questions were specifics relating to arrest and 
interrogation, the police communication of legal rights, the defendants' responses and 
the role of defense counsel. This portion of the Defendant Interview Schedule is set 
out in Appendix C infra. 
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sentation Project, the NLSP switchboard received 1,157 telephone 
requests for attorneys for 1,262 defendants. The Telephone Log 
Records contain data on all these requests. For the sole purpose of 
identifying the defendants reported upon in these Records, we shall 
refer to them throughout this study as the "telephone log defen-
dants." 
The Project's Volunteer Attorney Reports, which were designed 
by the Institute, were to be filled out by the attorneys after each tour 
of duty and returned by mail to NLSP. Approximately 84 per cent 
of the 1,262 cases logged, or 1,060 cases in all, were able to be as-
signed definitely to attorneys by the NLSP switchboard. The at-
torneys returned Volunteer Attorney Reports in 326 (31 per cent) 
of these assigned cases. For the purpose of identification, we shall use 
the label "volunteer attorney defendants" to refer to the 326 de-
fendants reported upon in these reports. 
Of the 260 defendants interviewed in the Defendant Interview 
Study, 175 (67 per cent) had been arrested prior to the Miranda 
decision, and 85 (33 per cent) had been arrested after 11iiranda. These 
two groups of defendants shall be identified on the basis of their 
time of arrest as "pre-Miranda defendants" and "post-Miranda de-
fendants," respectively.27 
For the purpose of analysis, one further breakdown is made of 
the 85 "post-Miranda defendants." Of these, 29 (34 per cent) even-
tually obtained counsel at the station house through the Precinct 
Representation Project,28 whereas 56 (66 per cent) had no lawyer at 
all at the police station.29 For the purpose of identification only, the 
former group shall be designated as "post-Miranda defendants with 
counsel," and the latter group shall be designated as "post-Miranda 
defendants without counsel." 
Our findings and conclusions, then, have been derived from an 
27. It should be noted that the term "post-Miranda defendants" properly describes 
the "volunteer attorney defendants" as well since they were in fact arrested after the 
Miranda decision. For purposes of this study, however, the two groups will be distin-
guished and the terms "volunteer attorney defendants" and "post-Miranda defen-
dants" used as identifying labels for the two separate samples. 
28. None of the defendants interviewed obtained counsel from any other source but 
the Project. Indeed, as previously noted, few defendants arrested throughout the year 
obtained non-Project counsel. 
29. It is obvious that a higher percentage of defendants who obtained counsel 
(34%) were interviewed in our sample than the percentage of all arrested defendants 
who obtained counsel (7%)- See text accompanying note 22 supra. Unfortunately, we 
could not obtain a sample in the same proportion because of the extreme difficulty in 
obtaining access to defendants for interviewing. It was easier to locate defendants who 
obtained counsel than those who did not because of our relationship to the Precinct 
Representation Project; we nevertheless interviewed more defendants who did not have 
counsel because of their overwhelming number. 
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analysis of data on six groups of defendants obtained from three 
sources, as set out in table 1.30 
TABLE I 
Defendant Groups and Data Sources 
Defendant Group 
Precinct Representation Project 
Telephone Log Defendants 
Volunteer Attorney Defendants 







Telephone Log Records 
Volunteer Attorney Reports 










a 1,157 telephone requests for attorneys were made for these 1,262 defendants. 
b Representing 31 per cent of the 1,060 cases for which volunteer attorneys were 
furnished. 
B. The Problem of Selection Bias 
I. The Data Sources 
a. Telephone Log Records. For analytical purposes, the Tele-
phone Log Records of the Precinct Representation Project cannot 
be faulted since every case of a defendant desiring counsel was re-
corded in the log by the NLSP switchboard operator who received 
the call. The log, therefore, is a complete record or "universe" of 
the telephone requests and gives us a picture of the Project's entire 
year of operation. 
b. Volunteer Attorney Reports. In contrast to the "telephone 
log defendants," the defendants reported upon in the Volunteer 
Attorney Reports and in the Defendant Interview Schedules con-
stituted samples, rather than complete universes. Unfortunately, 
there was no way of randomizing either sample. Thus, the sample of 
"volunteer attorney defendants" was selective in that some attorneys 
chose to fill out the report forms,31 and others chose not to do so for 
30. At times, the data from one sample will overlap with the data. from another 
so that we may contrast and compare the two. At other times, the data from one 
sample will not be comparable to that from another. So that no confusion as to the 
nature of the data occurs, we shall indicate in the footnotes and tables, where neces-
sary, the specific data source: Telephone Log Records, Volunteer Attorney Reports, 
or Defendant Interview Schedules. We use all three data sources in discussing police 
practices in Part III infra; only the Defendant Interview Schedules in discussing the 
defendant's reaction in Part IV infra; and only the Telephone Log Records and 
Volunteer Attorney Reports in discussing the attorney's role in Part V infra. 
31. As would be expected because of the sponsorship of the Project, most of the 
attorneys who returned the Reports were from the Junior Bar Section and the NLSP. 
Few were received from the Legal Interns or the other bar associations. 
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a variety of reasons. Moreover, with respect to the number of cases 
any particular attorney carried, there was an unquantifiable selectiv-
ity factor whenever the attorney decided upon which cases to report 
and which cases not to report. 
c. Defendant lnteruiew Schedules. As for the Defendant Inter-
view Schedules, we found it necessary to turn to private attorneys 
and to the various defender-type agencies to supply us with de-
fendants for interviews.32 By reason of our relationship to the Pre-
cinct Representation Project, we were able to arrange in advance 
with some of the volunteer attorneys to interview twenty-nine de-
fendants serviced by the Project. Obtaining access to other defen-
dants was far more difficult. Not all attorneys carrying criminal cases 
could be contacted by our staff;33 not all attorneys who were con-
tacted would cooperate with us;34 not all attorneys who cooperated 
by offering us interviews with their clients made available all (an 
entire universe) of their clients for a given period or even a sample 
selected on a random basis;35 and not all defendants made available 
for interviews could be contacted or would cooperate.86 Under 
these circumstances, some attorney selection bias was bound to be 
operative. Fortunately, certain mitigating factors discussed below 
greatly softened the effect of this bias. 
2. The Defendant lnteruiew Samples 
Since approximately half of our samples was supplied by de-
fender-type agencies handling only indigent defendants, since many 
more of our defendants were in fact indigent, and since indigent de-
fendants overwhelmingly predominate in the District of Columbia,37 
32. We were fortunate in securing the cooperation of the Legal Aid Agency of the 
District of Columbia (Public Defender), the Georgetown University Law Center's Legal 
Intern Program, and the Precinct Representation Project. Approximately half of our 
defendants were drawn from these defender-type agencies, and the remainder from 
private attorneys whose aid was solicited. In all, the 260 defendants in our interview 
sample were represented by approximately sixty-five different attorneys. 
33. Our staff contacted between 150 and 200 attorneys, of whom approximately 
100 were handling criminal cases and were able to provide us with permission to 
interview more than 400 defendants. 
34. Of the attorneys contacted who had criminal defendants as clients, only two 
refused outright to cooperate. 
35. In other words, attorneys who cooperated with us might have had specific 
clients in mind whom they wished interviewed and others whom they felt might not 
be appropriate. Selection was therefore on a basis personal to the attorney. 
36. Of the more than 400 defendants made available to us, 281 were interviewed. 
Of these, 21 were omitted from the sample by reason of incompleteness, incoherence, 
or an excessive time lag between arrest and interview. 
37. In its profile of the adult felon in the District of Columbia, the D.C. Crime 
Commission found that 55% had no history of regular employment, 46% were un-
employed at the time of their offense, 69% earned less than $3,000 annually, and 90% 
earned less than $5,000. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA, REPORT 795 (1966) [hereinafter D.C. REPORT]. 
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we hypothesized that our samples would reflect the type of defendant 
within the District. 
The profile of the defendant that ultimately emerged from our 
interview samples confirmed our hypothesis. The typical defendant 
in our sample is a young, single, Negro, male recidivist of low socio-
economic status characterized by low income, low educational attain-
ment, high unemployment, poor job status, borderline overcrowded 
living accommodations, and a dearth of voluntary afliliations.88 This 
profile is virtually congruent with the profile of the convicted adult 
felon set out in the Report of the President's Commission on Crime 
in the District of Columbia.89 Thus, although our samples could 
not be selected scientifically on a random basis, they were in fact 
representative of the District defendant population in demographic 
characteristics. 
3. The Volunteer Attorney Defendant Sample. 
We have no reason to believe that the profile characteristics of 
the "volunteer attorney defendant" sample differ in any marked man-
ner from the characteristics of our defendant interview profile or 
the profile developed in the District of Columbia Crime Commission 
report. For example, substantially all of the "volunteer attorney 
defendants" were Negro and indigent. At least, the profile of twenty-
nine of the "volunteer attorney defendants" is comparable to the 
profile of the twenty-nine "post-Miranda defendants with counsel" 
since these defendants are one and the same.40 
In order to determine whether and to what extent our sample 
of 326 "volunteer attorney defendants" was representative of the 
universe of 1,262 defendants reported upon in the Telephone Log 
Records, we devised two complementary tests: first, a comparison 
of the cases reported in the Telephone Log Records with those in 
the Volunteer Attorney Reports according to the crime charged; 
second, a comparison of the telephone log and volunteer attorney 
data according to the high-crime and low-crime police precincts 
38. A complete profile, together with a table of the profile characteristics of our 
defendant interview samples, is set forth in Appendix D infra. 
39. D.C. REPORT 117-20, 133-40. See also id. at 467, 795. The profile was developed 
for the Commission in a study by the Stanford Research Institute for the presentence 
reports of 932 felons convicted in 1964 and 1965 in the District. The report of the 
Stanford Research Institute is contained in the Appendix to the D.C. REPoRT at 511-
644. For a summary of the Crime Commission's Profile, see Medalie, The Offender 
Rehabilitation Project: A New Role for Defense Counsel at Pretrial and Sentencing, 
56 GEO. L.J. 2 (1967). 
40. With respect to the remainder, we could not justify to the Precinct Representa-
tion Project requiring the Volunteer Attorneys to gather complete demographic data. 
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from which the cases originated.41 The results of the first comparison 
are set out in table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Crimes Charged for Cases Reported in the Telephone Log 
Records and Volunteer Attorney Reports 
Telephone Log 
Crimes No. % 
Crimes Against Persons 527 46 
Homicidea 31 3 
Robberyb 158 14 
Sex Offensesc 51 4 
Assaultsd 287 25 
Crimes Against Property 347 31 
Larceny-Theft 137 12 
Auto Theft 68 6 
Housebreaking 123 11 
White Collare 19 2 
Miscellaneous Crimes 261 22 
Drug Offenses 59 5 
Weapons! 83 7 
All Othersg 119 10 
Undetermined 22 2 
Total 1,157 lOlh 
a Includes murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. 
b Includes robbery and attempted robbery. 
c Includes rape, attempted rape, sodomy, and carnal knowledge. 
d Includes aggravated and simple assault. 
e Includes counterfeiting, embezzlement, forgery, and fraud. 
f Includes carrying and possession. 



















h In this and other tables the total percentages may not add up to 100 per cent 
because of rounding off. 
With the exception of weapons offenses the Telephone Log and 
Attorney Reports are within one or at most two percentage points 
of each other for each of the offenses charged. We are, therefore, 
reasonably assured that, at least on the basis of crime charged, the 
defendants reported upon in the Volunteer Attorney Reports are 
representative of the universe of "telephone log defendants." 
The results of the second test based on high and low crime police 
precincts from which the cases originated are reported in table 3. 
Again the results show reasonable consistency. For both categories 
of defendants, the totals are within one percentage point of each 
other for both the low- and high-crime districts. Moreover, in 
a majority of the high crime precincts the results either are com-
pletely congruent with or are within one or a few percentage points 
of each other. On the basis of these two tests, then, we felt that the 
problem of attorney selection bias had been minimized. 
41. Cf. Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 11, at 1552-53, 1566 &: nn.123, 1567. 
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TABLE 3 
Telephone Log Records and Volunteer Attorney Reports 
by High Crime and Low Crime Precincts 
1359 
Telephone Log Attorney Reports 
Precinct No. % No. % 
High Crime Precincts 874 79 245 80 
l 248 22 89 29 
2 135 12 23 8 
5 104 9 33 11 
9 75 7 22 7 
10 118 11 31 10 
13 194 18 47 15 
Low Crime Precinctsa 234 21 61 20 
Total 1,108b 100 306c 100 
a All precincts with only 5 per cent or less of cases are grouped under this category. 
b Omitted from this analysis are 17 cases from the Metropolitan Police Women's 
Bureau and the U.S. Park Police, as well as 32 other cases which were not identified 
by precinct. 
c Omitted from this analysis are 20 cases which were not identified by precinct. 
C. The Problem of Respondent Bias 
Our data from the Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer 
Attorney Reports also raise certain problems as to respondent bias 
since the former relies upon the defendant as the source of informa-
tion and the latter relies upon both the defendant and attorney as 
sources. Thus, for example, the defendants might have lied or, by 
virtue of faulty memory, might have distorted the facts pertaining 
to their arrests or interrogations. 
Lying has always been a vexing problem in public opinion 
questionnaires,42 and its resolution is never totally satisfactory. As to 
the twenty-nine defendants interviewed who were also serviced by 
the Precinct Representation Project, we were able to compare the 
defendants' answers with those of the attorneys and found highly 
consistent results. Moreover, the warning, interrogation, and con-
fession rates obtained from the Volunteer Attorney Reports are 
virtually the same as the rates indicated by our post-Miranda data 
from the Defendant Interview Schedules.43 To the extent that the 
comparable statistics have turned out to be reasonably similar, we 
believe the incidence of respondent lying was minimized.44 
As for the faulty memory, public opinion experts have clearly 
42. See, e.S{., A. KINSEY, w. POMEROY&: C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN 
MALE 53-58 (1948); S. PAYNE, THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 17-33 (1951). 
43. See Part III infra. We also found that our findings on interrogation practices 
in the District of Columbia were similar to the findings in New Haven, Pittsburgh, 
and other cities. See generally studies discussed in note 11 supra. 
44. Nothing in our data suggested that the attorneys filled out their report forms 
without a highly rigid and scrupulous regard for honesty and exactitude. 
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established that events occurring within the preceding twdve-month 
period are most reliably recalled.45 None of our "post-Miranda de-
fendants" and few of our "pre-Miranda defendants" were required 
to think back beyond a year to dredge up information on arrest and 
interrogation.46 Problems of recall, therefore, occurred only for a 
handful of respondents. 
An additional problem stems from the very nature of the sources 
of our data. The data do not necessarily represent the reality of 
what occurred so much as what the defendants and attorneys per-
ceived to be the reality and what they thereafter reported. To the 
extent that we sought and elicited the defendants' attitudes, under-
standing, and perceptions, we are satisfied with the results. To the 
extent, however, that we sought information as to what actually oc-
curred during the arrest and interrogation situation, we must rec-
ognize the possible distortions in the data gathered. 
Although we believe that most of the distortion and bias in our 
data have been offset or mitigated, we nevertheless recognize that 
some degree of distortion or bias must still exist. For this reason, 
we offer the report of our investigations with this cautionary pro-
logue. 
III. THE DEFENDANT'S PERCEPTION OF POLICE PRACTICES 
UNDER MIRANDA 
A. The Official Response of the District of Columbia 
Police Department to Miranda 
Approximately a month after Miranda was decided, the District 
of Columbia Police Department issued its General Order No. 9-C,47 
an elaborate five-page, single-spaced document explaining in detail 
the Miranda requirements and reasoning. In accordance with 
45. See, e.g., Robbins, The Accuracy of Parental Recall of Aspects of Child De• 
velopment and of Child Rearing Practices, 66 J. ABsTRACT &: SocIAL PsYCH. 261 (1963). 
46. Those defendants with too great a time lag between arrest and interview were 
eliminated from the sample. See note 36 supra. While minimizing the effect of respon-
dent lying and distortion, we nevertheless acknowledge that it is a problem. In the 
New Haven study, it was determined that "[a]lmost half of the interviewed suspects 
whom we had observed described their interrogations differently than our observer," 
and while some "reported the process more favorably ... most respondents reported 
a more hostile interrogation than our observer recorded." Interrogation in New Haven, 
supra note 11, at 1530-31. At the same time, the authors also admitted that, even if 
they did not assume any exaggeration by the defendants not observed, their descrip-
tion of what occurred was "similar" to what had been observed. Id. at 1531. For pur-
poses of our study, whatever distortion occurred in the recounting is not a crucial 
factor since our primary interest was in the defendants' perception of the process and 
of his legal rights. 
47. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, General Order No. 9-C, Series 1964, 
July 16, 1966 [hereinafter General Order No. 9-C]. 
May 1968] Implementation of Miranda in D.C. 1361 
Miranda, the order required warnings of rights to be given prior to 
any custodial interrogation.48 Police officers were reminded "that the 
critical point is the time the arrest is made or the person's freedom 
of action is limited, for it is then that the person must be fully ad-
vised of his rights."49 
The order went on to explain virtually in the language of 
Miranda how the police were to act following the administration of 
the warnings. 50 Among other requirements, the police were given 
the following advice: 
If the defendant indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking 
there can be no questioning. 
If the defendant is alone and indicates in any manner that he does 
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.51 
In accordance with Miranda,52 the order observed that a defen-
dant could waive his rights, but the waiver would have to be made 
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."53 If there were such a 
waiver, however, the police would have to ensure that they had evi-
dence that the defendant completely understood his rights and 
freely waived them. One method of proof to be used was a "Warning 
and Consent" form the accused was to sign after reading the warn-
ings. Besides repeating the warnings, 54 the form contained a "Consent 
To Speak" section which read as follows: "I know what my rights 
are. I am willing to make a statement and answer the questions. I 
do not want a lawyer. I understand and know what I am doing. No 
promises or threats have been made to me or used against me."55 
48. The text of the police warnings are as follows: 
You are under arrest. Before we ask you any questions, you must understand 
what your rights are. 
You have the right to remain silent. You are not required to say anything to 
us at any time or to answer any questions. Anything you say can be used against 
you in court. 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we question you and 
to have him with you during questioning. 
If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be provided for you. 
If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still 
have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop 
answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer. 
Id. at 2. 
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 2-3. 
51. Id. at 3. 
52. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
53. General Order No. 9-C, at 3. 
54. For the text of these warnings, see note 48 supra. 
55. General Order No. 9-C, Attachment. Of the sixteen "post-Miranda defendants" 
who were shown rights warnings in writing by the police, seven were asked to sign 
the "Consent To Speak" form and only four actually signed it. 
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B. The Actual Response of the District of Columbia Police 
Department to Miranda 
In order to determine the actual response of the police depart-
ment, we shall first analyze the frequency with which defendants 
reported being warned of their rights and being interrogated by 
the police. We shall then analyze the relationship between interroga-
tion and the giving of warnings by the police and the decision by 
defendants whether or not to give statements to the police. There-
after, we shall analyze whether statements were given following police 
warnings. Finally, we shall determine the kinds of statements given 
by defendants at the different stages of the post-arrest process. 
I. Warnings of Rights 
Miranda and General Order No. 9-C apparently affected the 
rate at which at least one or more of the required warnings were 
given to those who were arrested.56 According to our data from the 
defendants, the warning rate rose from slightly over 50 per cent 
before the Miranda decision57 to 75 per cent after Miranda.58 Of even 
more significance is the rate of specific warnings given to the de-
fendants by the police, as set forth in table 4. 59 
56. Unlike many of the suspects discussed in Reiss and Black's article on field 
interrogation (Reiss &: Black, supra note 11), the defendants in our samples were all 
under arrest. We are thus not faced with the problem of deciding whether or not a 
street detention is equivalent to custody or a deprivation of the suspect's "freedom of 
action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
57. The Police Department had been under a general order to give Miranda-type 
warnings even before the decision in Miranda, with, of course, the exception that, 
instead of advising a defendant that he had the right to the presence of counsel with-
out charge at the station, the police advised that, if he wished counsel, one would be 
appointed in court. See D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, General Order No. 9-B, 
Series 1964, Aug. 11, 1965. 
58. In the sample of "post-Miranda defendants,'' a sharp differentiation appeared: 
although fewer than two thirds of the "defendants without counsel" reported receiving 
any kind of warning, well over 90% of the "defendants with counsel" reported being 
warned of their rights. Similarly, over 90% of the "volunteer attorney defendants" 
also said they had been warned of their rights. An analysis of the warnings of rights 
given to the different defendant groups is set out in table E-4, Appendix E, infra. 
A comparable differentiation between the "post-Miranda defendants with counsel" and 
those "without counsel" may be seen in the number of times each defendant reported 
being given one or more of the Miranda warnings, as set out in table E-5, Appendix 
E, infra. 
59. In order to elicit information whether specific warnings of silence or counsel 
had been given to the defendants, we asked each interviewed defendant such questions 
as whether he had been told he didn't have to say anything to the police at any time 
or to answer any questions, or whether he had been advised that he had a right to 
consult with counsel at the station house. To mitigate the effect of prompted answers, 
we first asked the defendant two general questions and took his verbatim response: 
"What did the policeman say to you when you were arrested?" and "When you got to 
the police station, what happened then?" Although we recognized the problem of recall 
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b Each warning category is mutually exclusive of the others. 
c Not ascertained: 1. 
d Not ascertained: 4. 










t Combines silence warning and warning that "anything you say may be used 
against you.'' 
a: Combines warnings of right to counsel in court and right to telephone own counsel. 
h Combines warnings of right to presence of counsel at station house and right to 
appointed counsel. 
This table shows that Miranda clearly affected the giving of 
specific warnings by the police. The police, however, fell far short 
of the standards set by the Court. For example, if we combine warn-
ings I, 2, and 3 relating to the right of silence, and warnings 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 relating to the right to some type of counsel, we see that 
almost double the percentage of "post-Miranda defendants" said 
they received these separate warnings as did the "pre-Miranda de-
fendants." Even at that, however, only slightly more than half of 
the "post-Miranda defendants" reported receiving either the silence 
or counsel warning. Thus, as reported by the defendants, 51 per cent 
of the "post-Miranda" group received the silence warning, whereas 
only 26 per cent of the "pre-Miranda" group did; 55 per cent of the 
"post-Miranda defendants" received a counsel warning, whereas 
only 29 per cent of the "pre-Miranda defendants" did. 
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Even more significant, only 40 per cent of the "post-Miranda 
defendants" stated they had been given the specific station-house 
counsel warning, 60 and only 30 per cent said they had received all 
four Miranda warnings. 61 
From the foregoing data, it is evident that, during the year fol-
lowing the Court's decision in Miranda, the police in the District of 
Columbia were reported as not having given arrested persons any-
where near the complete battery of warnings required, not only by 
the Miranda decision itself, but also by the Police Department's 
own General Order. But whether proper warning was or was not 
given is not the end of the investigation. The Miranda warning re-
quirements are operative only "if a person in custody is to be sub-
jected to interrogation."62 Those who are not interrogated need not 
be given rights warnings. In any assessment of police practices under 
Miranda, therefore, it is necessary to determine the rate of interro-
gation of those who were warned and the results of that interrogation. 
2. Interrogation and Warnings63 
According to the data derived from our defendant interviews, 
the interrogation rate dropped from 55 per cent before Miranda to 
in these types of questions, we nevertheless believed that the results would give us at 
least an insight into the police warning practices. 
In analyzing the results, we decided to combine the response to various warnings. 
Because of the small cell groups responding to the right to the presence of station-
house counsel and the right to free or appointed counsel, we combined the responses 
to these two warnings. We also combined the silence warning with the response to the 
warning that anything one says can be used against him in court. Some defendants 
reported that they had received warnings not of the right to station-house counsel but 
of the right to counsel in court or only of the right to call a lawyer himself. These 
responses were also combined. At the same time, however, we believed it important 
to see the pattern of combined warnings, e.g., silence and counsel. These considerations 
therefore served as the basis for table 4. 
60. See table 4, warnings 3 and 5, supra. Interestingly, only 21 % of the "post-
Miranda defendants without counsel" reported being given the station-house counsel 
warning in contrast to 73% of the "defendants with counsel." Since the designation of 
"with counsel" is only for identification purposes, of course, there is no implication 
that these defendants were given the warnings because they had counsel. Rather the 
true relationship is the other way around, namely, the effect of the warnings on the 
decision to request counsel. This relationship, as well as the relationship between the 
silence warning and the decision to remain silent is discussed in part IV.B. infra. 
61. See table 4, warning 3, supra. The table also shows that only 17% of the 
"post-Miranda defendants without counsel" said they had been given all four Miranda 
warnings in contrast to 52% of the "defendants with counsel." 
62. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). See also note 22 supra. 
63. For purpose of our study, we defined "interrogation" to mean any questioning 
initiated by police officers, beyond mere identification of the person, that related to 
any offense. This definition was somewhat broader than the one used by Reiss and 
Black in their study of field interrogation: "For purpose of the field study, an inter-
rogation was defined operationally as any questioning of a probing nature that went 
beyond mere identification of the person and that led to defining the person as a sus-
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48 per cent after Miranda.64 At the same time, over half of the "post-
Miranda defendants with counsel," as well as half of the "volunteer 
attorney defendants," maintained that they had been interrogated 
before the attorneys arrived at the police station. Indeed, even the 
police themselves admitted to the attorneys that they had interro-
gated close to one quarter of the "volunteer attorney defendants" 
before the attorneys arrived. Obviously, any upward distortions in 
the reporting of the interrogation rate by the defendants may be 
considered as being offset by dmrnward distortions by the police. 
Even if we were to assume that the interrogation rate in fact had 
been somewhere in the middle (37 per cent), it would still be sig-
nificant for purposes of our inquiry. The pattern of interrogation is 
set out in table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Interrogationa of Difjerent Defendant Groupsb 
Volunteer-Attorney 
Defendants 
Pre- Post-./1,firanda Defendants 
Miranda Defen- Police 
Defen- Without With dant Admis-
dants Total Counsel Counsel Claimsc sionsd 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Interrogation 97 55 41 48 26 46 15 52 148 50 68 24 
No interrogation 78 45 44 52 30 54 14 48 146 50 214 76 
Total 175 100 85 100 56 100 29 100 294 100 282 100 
a Nine of the "pre-Miranda defendants" and 3 of the "post-Miranda defendants" 
stated that they had been "threatened" by the police, but gave no other indication that 
they had been interrogated. Out of caution, we decided to categorize these 12 defen-
dants in the "No Interrogation" column. 
b Data Sources: Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
c Not ascertained: 32. 
d Not ascertained: 44. 
Of the forty-one "post-Miranda defendants" who were interro-
gated, twelve (29 per cent) claimed that they had not been given a 
pect or offender." Reiss &: Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, ANNAI.S OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF PoL. &: Soc. Ser., Nov. 1967, at 47, 50. Moreover, as we pointed out 
in note 56 supra, all interrogation for purposes of our study took place while the sus-
pects were under arrest. Unfortunately, because of the limitations of our study, we 
were unable to ascertain the types of tactics used by the police during interrogation 
or the extent of the evidence the police had prior to conviction. 
64. As might be expected, the interrogation rate varied considerably with the crime 
charged from a high of 75% for homicide to a low of 10% for sex offenses, and with 
rates higher than the 50% average for drug offenses, auto theft, assault, larceny-theft, 
and housebreaking. The pattern of interrogation by crime is set out in table E-6, 
Appendix E, infra. See generally Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 
76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1552-53, 1566 &: n.123, 1567 (1967). 
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single Miranda warning65 and were therefore interrogated by the 
police in clear violation of Miranda and the Police Department's 
General Order. The remaining twenty-nine "post-Miranda defen-
dants" who were interrogated, however, said they had received 
Miranda warnings of some type;66 eighteen of them (62 per cent) re-
ported that they had not been given all four Miranda warnings67 
and were therefore also interrogated in clear violation of Miranda 
and the General Order.68 
3. Police Practices Affecting the Admissibility of Statements Given 
In Miranda, the Court pointed out that not all statements given 
by a defendant were to be barred from evidence, even if no warnings 
had been given: ''Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred 
by the Fifth Amendment."69 The Court explained that "[t]here is 
no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station 
and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls 
the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires 
to make."70 Of the thirty-four "post-Miranda defendants" who re-
ported giving statements to the police, thirteen (38 per cent) stated 
that they had volunteered the statements without being interro-
gated.71 The remaining twenty-one "post-N[iranda defendants" main-
tained that they had given statements as a result of interrogation, 
and, of these, six (29 per cent) were given no warnings.72 Since the 
warnings are "prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement 
made by a defendant"73 following interrogation, the statements by 
65. See table E-7, Appendix. E, infra. Of these twelve, eleven were "defendants with-
out counsel" and one was a "defendant with counsel." Of 147 "volunteer attorney de-
fendants" who were interrogated, fourteen (10%) also reported not being given any 
Miranda warning. See id. 
66. See id. Of these twenty-nine, fifteen were "defendants without counsel" and 
fourteen were "defendants with counsel." The remaining 133 "volunteer attorney de-
fendants" (90%) who were interrogated also claimed receiving Miranda warnings of 
some type. See id. 
67. The remaining eleven received all four Miranda warnings. 
68. Of the eighty-five "post-Miranda defendants," twenty-six (31%) informed the 
police at some point in the post-arrest process that they did not wish to talk or to 
continue to talk. The police were reported to have stopped interrogation in thirteen 
of these cases (50%), to have asked the defendant to reconsider in four cases (15%), 
ignored the defendant's wishes in six cases (23%), and threatened the defendant in two 
cases (8%), No information as to subsequent action of the police was available for the 
remaining defendant. 
69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 
70. 384 U.S. at 478. 
71. See table E-8, Appendix E, infra. Of the 126 "volunteer attorney defendants" 
who said they had given statements, six.teen (13%) reported giving the statements vol-
untarily. See id. 
72. See table E-9, Appendix. E, infra. 0£ the 109 "volunteer attorney defendants" 
who reported giving such statements, twelve (11 %) were given no warnings. See id. 
73. 384 U.S. at 476. 
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these six would have had to be suppressed in any subsequent pro-
ceeding if the issue had been presented. As for the statements re-
sulting from interrogation by the remaining fifteen (71 per cent) 
"post-Miranda defendants" who received one or more of the Miranda 
warnings, those which were not preceded by all four warnings would 
also have had to be declared inadmissible.74 
But even if all defendants had been given complete and valid 
warnings, the police, by virtue of Miranda and the General Order, 
were required to obtain a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver 
from all the defendants interrogated.75 From what we were able to 
determine, however, only four "post-Miranda defendants" signed76 
the "Consent To Speak" form;77 and, even this act of signing the 
waiver form was not really indicative of a knowing and intelligent 
waiver. As the Supreme Court said of Miranda's signed confession, 
"[t]he mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-
in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does 
not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to re-
linquish constitutional rights."78 
Finally, as we shall explore in detail in another part of this 
Article, a significant number of "post-Miranda defendants" did not 
understand the rights warnings.79 Therefore, interrogation of any 
of these defendants, even with formal waiver, would have been in-
valid because the waiver would presumably have been adjudged as 
not knowing and intelligent. Without the proper waiver, of course, 
the statements obtained could not have been used against the de-
fendants. 80 
4. Incriminatory Statements Elicited at Arrest 
and at the Station House 
The warning and station-house counsel requirements prescribed 
in Miranda rested in part on the Court's view of the interrogation 
process. The process it described takes place "in privacy"81-"in a 
room ... cut off from the outside world."82 The "salient features" 
74. See Table E-9, Appendix E, infra. So, too, would the statements by the ninety-
seven of the 109 "volunteer attorney defendants" (89%) who claimed to have received 
one or more of the Miranda warnings. See id. 
75. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 479 (1966); General Order No. 9-C, 
at 3. 
76. See note 55 supra. 
77. General Order No. 9-C, Attachment; see text accompanying note 55 supra. 
78. 384 U.S. at 492. 
79. See Part IV-C, infra. 
80. 384 U.S. at 479. 
81. 384 U.S. at 448. 
82. 384 U.S. at 445. 
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of the process were set forth as being "incommunicado interrogation 
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional 
rights.83 
The reality of the interrogation process in the District of Co-
lumbia turned out to be somewhat different from the Court's model. 
Of the 148 "volunteer attorney defendants" who claimed to have 
been interrogated by the police, slightly over one third (50) were 
interrogated not in a room cut off from the outside world but in 
a public place at the time and place of arrest; one third (49) were 
interrogated in various parts of the police station; and over one 
quarter (41) were interrogated in both places.84 
The warning rate of the "volunteer attorney defendants" in-
terrogated at the various stages of the post-arrest process remained 
fairly uniform. Of the fifty interrogated at arrest, forty-six (92 per 
cent) said they were warned of their rights; of the forty-nine in-
terrogated at the station house, forty-three (88 per cent) were so 
warned; and of the forty-one interrogated in both places, thirty-
eight (93 per cent) were warned. These high warning rates do not 
tell the full story, however, since apparently interrogation periodi-
cally took place either before the defendants were warned or at a 
place other than where the defendants were warned. This practice 
may explain why these findings on warnings contrast sharply with 
those of Reiss and Black in their study of field interrogation in 
Boston, Chicago, and the District of Columbia: 
During the observation period, the Miranda warning rarely was 
given to suspects in field settings. A citizen was apprised of at 
least one of the rights specified in the Miranda decision in 3 per-
cent of the police encounters with suspects. In only three cases 
were all four rights warnings mentioned in Miranda used in the 
warning.85 
Whether or not interrogation took place or warnings were given, 
the fact remains that many incriminatory statements were given at 
the time and place of arrest, as shown in tables 6 and 7. 
83. 384 U.S. at 445. For a description of the interrogation process by the Court, see 
384 U.S. at 445-58. A summary of this description may be found in Interrogation in 
New Haven, supra note 64, at 1533-36. Despite this emphasis, the Court made its re-
quirements applicable not only to questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into "custody," but also to questioning while a person is 
"deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. Presumably 
this had reference at least to on-the-street interrogation following arrest, if not to on-
the-street interrogation following something less than arrest. 
84. Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. The place of interrogation for the 
remaining eight defendants (5%) could not be ascertained. 
85. Reiss &: Black, supra note 63, at 55 n.6. 
May 1968] Implementation of Miranda in D.C. 1369 
TABLE 6 
Inculpatory and Exculpatory Statements Given by Volunteer 
Attorney Defendants Interrogated upon Arrest, at the 
Station House, and Both Placesa. 
Inculpatory Exculpatory Other 
Statements Statements Statementsb Total 
Place of 
Interrogation No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Upon Arrest 19 51 11 28 6 21 36 34 
At the Station 
House 7 19 17 41 12 41 36 34 
Both Places 11 30 13 32 11 38 35 33 
Totalc 37 100 41 101 39 100 107 101 
a Data Source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Includes unrelated and uncharacterized statements. 
c No statements: 18; statements not ascertained: 20; place of interrogation not 
ascertained: 3; not interrogated: 146; interrogation not ascertained: 32. 
TABLE 7 
"Incriminatory" Statements Given by Volunteer Attorney 
Defendants Interrogated upon Arrest and at the Station House 
Incul- Excul- "Incrimi-
patory patory natory" Other 
State- State- State- State-
ments ments mentso. mentsb Total 
Place of 
Interrogation No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Upon Arrestc 30 81 24 59 54 69 17 59 71 66 
At the Station 
House 7 19 17 41 24 31 12 41 36 34 
Total 37 100 41 100 78 100 29 100 107 100 
a Includes both inculpatory and exculpatory statements. See text following this 
table. 
b Includes unrelated and uncharacterized statements. 
c Includes statements upon arrest and at both places. See table 6, supra. 
As shown by table 6, a majority of the thirty-seven inculpatory 
statements (51 per cent) was reported to have been elicited by the 
police at the time and place of arrest. If we combine the categories 
of interrogation at arrest and interrogation both at arrest and the 
station house (both places), as in table 7, we find that thirty out of 
thirty-seven "volunteer attorney defendants" (81 per cent) were 
said by their attorneys to have given inculpatory statements upon 
arrest. 
But even this analysis is not complete. The Court in Miranda 
noted that "no distinction may be drawn bet1veen inculpatory state-
ments and statements alleged to be merely 'exculpatory' " since 
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"these statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the 
word."86 Thus, if we combine inculpatory and exculpatory state-
ments, we find that fifty-four out of seventy-eight defendants (69 
per cent) were said to have given "incriminatory" statements upon 
arrest. 
This then is how the defendants perceived what occurred to 
them and how the police acted following arrest. The other side of the 
story, however, is how the defendants themselves reacted to their 
arrest and the police practices that followed. It is to this question 
that we now turn. 
IV. THE DEFENDANT'S REACTION TO THE MIRANDA WARNINGS 
A. The Court's Reasons for Requiring the Warnings 
James Mill in his Essay on Government propounded the view 
that a proper knowledge of one's self-interest would lead one to act 
in accordance with that interest.87 According to Mill's son, John 
Stuart, so complete was his father's "reliance on the influence of 
reason over the minds of mankind ... that he felt as if all would be 
gained if the whole population were taught to read."88 James Mill's 
"fundamental doctrine," said his son, "was the ... unlimited possi-
bility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind 
by education."89 
The underlying philosophy of the Court's decision in Miranda 
is closely akin to Mill's eighteenth-century Utilitarian views. Im-
plicit throughout the opinion is the assumption that once the de-
fendant is properly warned of his legal rights he will be in a position 
to act in accordance with his interest in remaining silent and re-
questing a lawyer. 
The Court's philosophical position may be most clearly seen in 
its characterization of the right-to-silence warning. The warning is 
needed, the Court avowed, in order to make the accused "aware" 
of the right.90 In effect, the silence warning is "the threshhold re-
quirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise."91 It "in-
86. 384 U.S. at 477. 
87. "[I]f the parties who act contrary to their interest had a proper knowledge of 
that interest, they would act well. What is necessary, then, is knowledge." James Mill, 
An Essay on Government, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 885 
(1939). 
88. JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 89 (W'orld Classics ed. 1931). 
89. Id. at 91; see also J. PENNOCK, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ITS MERITS AND PROSPECTS 
17 (1950). 
90. 384 U.S. at 468. 
91. 384 U.S. at 468. 
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sure[s] that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege 
at that point in time"92 and shows the individual "that his interro-
gators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to 
exercise it."93 In like manner, the Court maintained, the warning 
that anything said can and will be used against the accused makes 
him aware "not only of the privilege but also of the consequences 
of foregoing it."94 This awareness assures a "real understanding and 
intelligent exercise of the privilege" and serves to make the accused 
"more accurately aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary 
system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in 
his interest. "95 
Unfortunately, the Court's vision of how Miranda would operate 
has become somewhat blurred in practice, as our statistics of interro-
gation and confession demonstrate. We must therefore ask what did 
the Afiranda warnings mean to the defendants and to what extent 
were they helped by the recital of warnings.96 
B. The J?efendant's Behavior Following the Warnings 
A definite relationship existed between the giving of the warning 
of the right to station-house counsel97 and the "post-Miranda de-
fendants' " decision to obtain counsel: close to two thirds of these 
92. 384 U.S. at 469. 
93. 384 U.S. at 468. 
94. 384 U.S. at 469. 
95. 384 U.S. at 469. The court continued in this vein for the other warnings as well. 
Thus, concerning the right to the presence of an attorney, it said: "Only through such 
warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right." 
384 U.S. at 472. Concerning the right to an appointed counsel, the Court added: 
Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with 
counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a 
lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to 
counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the in-
digent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he 
too has a right to have Counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to re-
main silent and the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explana-
tion to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a 
position to exercise it. 
384 U.S. at 473. 
96. In light of the profile of the defendants in our interview samples, see text at 
notes 38-39 supra and Appendix D infra, perhaps we should also repeat the questions 
posed by Elsen and Rosett: 
[W]hat will the Miranda warnings tell the uneducated, deprived, and disadvan-
taged who arc the grist of the criminal system's mill? How will the ignorant or 
subnormal defendant be significantly helped by the recital of some legal abstrac-
tions? As for those somewhat more aware of their rights, a general warning will 
probably be of little assistance, since their problem is to decide what to do about 
those rights. 
Elsen &: Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLUllf. L. 
R.Ev. 645, 655-56 (1967). 
97. Combines warnings of the right to the presence of counsel at the station house 
and the right to appointed counsel. See table 4 n.h supra. 
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defendants who reported receiving this warning did request counsel. 
Yet the fact remains that over one third of these defendants re-
ceiving the warning did not request counsel. Moreover, when no 
warnings were given or when warnings other than the right to 
station-house counsel were given, the overwhelming response of well 
over three quarters of the remaining "post-Miranda defendants" 
was not to request counsel. The results are set forth in table 8. 
TABLE 8 
Results of Specific Warnings of Post-Miranda Defendantsa 
by Whether Counsel Requested" 
Counsel Counsel Not 
Requested 
Warnings of Rightsc No. % 
Non-Station-House Counsel 2 17 
Station-House Counsel 21 64 
Silence Alone 3 23 
Neither Counsel nor Silenced 3 12 
Undetermined 
Total 29 34 
a Only 2 of the 175 "pre-Miranda defendants" requested counsel. 
b Data source: Defendant Interview Schedules. 









d Includes warnings of phone and/or bond, as well as no warning. 
e An asterisk. in this and other tables means an irrelevant or insignificant percent-
age. 
Similarly, a parallel relationship existed between the warning 
of the right to silence98 and the "post-Miranda defendants'" refusal 
to give statements to the police:99 60 per cent of these defendants 
who said they were given the warning gave no statements; the other 
40 per cent, however, did give statements despite the warning. At 
the same time, when no silence or other warnings were said to have 
been given, over half of the remaining "post-Miranda defendants" 
gave statements to the police. The results for all defendant groups 
are set out in table 9. 
C. The Defendant's Understanding of the Warnings 
In order to test their cognitive understanding, we gave full 
Miranda-type warnings one at a time to the defendants,100 and, after 
98. This warning combines the literal warning of the right to silence and the 
warning that "anything you say may be used against you." See table 4 n.f supra. 
99. A similar but not so dramatic pattern was apparent with the "pre-Miranda 
defendants." 
100. The warnings we used were as follows: 
You have been placed under arrest. You are not required to say anything to us at 
TABLE 9 
Results of Specific Warnings of Pre- and Post-Miranda Defendants 




Warnings of Rights No. % No. % 
Silencec 21 47 24 53 
Counsel Aloned 15 50 15 50 
Neither Silence Nor 
Counselc 39 39 60 61 
Undetermined 
- - - -
Total 75 43 99 57 
n Data source: Defendant Interview Schedules. 









Total Without Counsel 
No No 
Statements Statements Statements 
No. % No. % No. % 
26 60 9 36 16 64 
7 54 3 43 4 57 








No. % No. % 
8 44 10 56 
3 50 3 50 
1 50 I 50 
- -
3 • 
12 41 17 59 
c Includes silence alone and silence with other warnings. There was little difference in result between the effect of the silence warning alone and 
the effect of all Miranda warnings. 
d Because the cell groups were so small, this category includes warnings of both station-house and non-station-house counsel. See table 4 nn. 
g & h supra. 
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each, asked what the warning meant to them.101 The defendants' 
answers were then rated as signifying either "understanding" or 
"misunderstanding."102 The ratings indicated that 15 per cent of the 
eighty-five "post-Miranda defendants" failed to understand the right 
to silence warning, 18 per cent failed to understand the warning of 
the right to the presence of counsel, and 24 per cent failed to under-
stand the warning of the right to appointed counsel.103 
We were able to derive an added insight into the defendants' 
understanding of the warnings by obtaining their verbatim com-
ments of what they felt about the way the police told them of their 
rights.104 A number were cynical about the procedure, and believed 
the warnings to be "merely a formality" given to them only be-
cause the police "had to." Thus, one defendant complained that the 
police "didn't seem to care whether we understood or not," and 
another noted that the police officer giving the warnings "was as 
ignorant of my rights as I was myself. He was only reading a state-
ment."105 
any time or to answer any questions. Anything you say may be used against you 
as evidence in Court. 
Your lawyer may be present here during the police interrogation and you may 
consult with him. 
If you cannot afford to retain a lawyer privately, you have the right to have a 
lawyer appointed to represent you free of charge at the police station. 
101. Our interviewers gave these warnings to the defendants interviewed in as 
neutral a manner as possible. To be sure, this procedure could not duplicate the 
atmosphere at arrest or at the station house, where the possible anxiety of the defen-
dant and the possible partisan manner of the police (see Interrogation in New Haven, 
supra note 64, at 1552) would probably lead to greater misunderstanding and confusion 
as to the meaning of the warnings than was registered by the defendants in our inter-
views. Consequently, if anything, our results understate the defendants' rate of mis-
understanding of the warnings. 
102. "Understanding" included both complete and partial understanding. Complete 
understanding was indicated either by an explanation which signified understanding 
or a definitional statement as to the specified right. A number of respondents answered 
by saying that the right "means just what it says." This response was considered to be 
a partial understanding. Our interviewers reported that the somewhat more educated 
or aggressive persons gave this response and resented any attempt at clarification. "Mis-
understanding" included both complete and partial misunderstanding. Complete mis-
understanding included the response, "I don't know." Partial misunderstanding in-
cluded such responses as "That would mean I'm in trouble"; "That wouldn't mean 
anything to me since I'm innocent"; or "That would mean a lot to me." 
103. The "pre-Miranda defendants" had a comparable rate of misunderstanding of 
the first two warnings (18 and 19% respectively), but went up to 36% misunderstand-
ing for the right to appointed counsel. The results are set out in table E-10, Appendix 
E, infra. 
104. The verbatim comments of the defendants, as well as the volunteer attorneys, 
are contained in the various Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney 
Reports, on file at the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure. Each Schedule and 
Report has a code number. A master index of the quotations according to subject 
matter is also kept on file. 
105. Other such statements included: "I don't think they really mean it"; the police 
were "unjust"; the police "didn't truly tell me of my rights-they held back"; "they 
thought I was guilty already." 
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On the other hand, several other defendants accepted the warn-
ings from the police at their face value. As one remarked, "They 
were helpful. [The police] ... explained ... [the warnings] very 
clearly, which is more than they used to do." Others remarked that 
"[t]hey talked like they meant it"; "they made a big thing about it"; 
"they wanted it to be known they had about eight people watching 
as witnesses." 
There were many misconceptions as to the meaning of the right 
to station-house counsel. The following were typical misinterpreta-
tions of the warning by the defendants: 
-The police "had some lawyer of their own who was working 
with them." 
-It means that "I would have to pay for a lawyer." 
-They planned to "appoint someone at court." 
-"I just have to write for one and wait for him to answer." 
-"I don't know why one would need a lawyer in a station house; 
it's never done." 
-The warning "means I would answer [ questions by the police] 
if a lawyer is present." 
Other defendants were not even able to get to the point of in-
terpreting the warning. For example, one was shown the police 
card with the warnings on it, but failed to read it, and another was so 
wrought up that his "mind wasn't functioning." "I couldn't think," 
he reported. 
Some defendants had comparable misconceptions about the right-
to-silence warning. Several understood it to mean that they had the 
right to talk. Some had the opposite impression that the police either 
did not want them to talk or would not let them talk. Others per-
ceived a garbled version. As one said, it means that "I should have 
the right to say something so they can use it in evidence in court," 
and another added that it meant that "[i]f I ... like try to bribe 
them, they would use it against me in court." Still others propounded 
more involved interpretations. "If I'm innocent," said one, "I should 
tell the truth." Another recognized the dilemma presented: the 
warning means "that if I said anything false it would go hard on 
me; if I tell the truth, then trouble." 
I. The Relationship of the Defendant's Understanding to 
His Behavior 
More significant than the defendant's understanding of the 
warnings is the relationship of this understanding ( or misunder-
standing) to the decisions each defendant made concerning the right 
to counsel and the right to silence. 
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As may be seen in tables 10 and 11, 66 per cent of those who 
understood the station-house counsel warning given by the police-
requested counsel,106 and approximately 60 per cent of those who 
understood the silence warning did not give statements.107 
2. The Inverse Relationship of the Defendant's Understanding 
to His Behavior 
A further question raised by tables 10 and 11 is why the 34 
per cent of the "post-Miranda defendants" who understood the 
counsel warnings did not request counsel and why the 41 per cent 
who understood the silence warning did not remain silent. 
Several commentators have attempted explanation. Elsen and 
Rosett have observed: 
To predict how a suspect's insistence on his rights will affect his 
chances of avoiding prosecution requires an intimate knowledge 
of the system which cannot be conveyed by a warning, however 
improved. . . . The suspect . . . does not know if his request for 
counsel will annoy the police, the prosecutor or a jury. The £act 
that he has been warned as required by Miranda may have little 
bearing on his decision whether counsel should be waived . . . . A 
suspect may well choose not to be a "wise guy" who will land in 
jail as a reward for his insistence on his rights.1os 
And the editors of the Yale Law I ournal have noted: 
The suspect arrested and brought downtown for questioning is in 
a crisis-laden situation. The stakes for him are high-often his 
freedom for a few or many years-and his prospects hinge on de-
cisions that must be quickly made: To cooperate and hope for 
leniency, to try and talk his way out, to stand adamantly on his 
rights .... The likely consequences of the alternatives open to him 
are unclear-how much leniency cooperation may earn, how likely 
fast talk is to succeed, how much a steadfast refusal to talk may 
contribute to a decision by the police, prosecutor or judge to "throw 
the book" at him.;09 
Thus, while these defendants may have had a cognitive understand-
ing of their rights, they had no appreciation of them and lacked the 
ability to apply them to their "crisis-laden" situations. This is borne 
out by many of the statements of the defendants we obtained in our 
interviews. Although these statements could not be quantitatively 
106. The cell size for those who did not understand the counsel warning is too 
small for analysis. 
107. Again, the cell size for the "misunderstanding" response to the silence warning 
is too small for analysis. 
108. Elsen &: Rosett, supra note 96, at 658. 
109. Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 64, at 1613-14. 
TABLE IO 
Results of Understanding of Station-House Counsel Warning 
by Whether Counsel Requesteda 
Understanding 
No. % No. 
Counsel Requested 19 
Counsel Not Requested IO 
To~ ~ 





Results of Understanding of Silence Warning by Pre- and Post-
Miranda Defendants by Whether Statements Givenn 
Post-Miranda Defendants 
Pre-Miranda Defendantsb Total Without Counsel 
Under. Misunder. Under. Misunder. Under. Misunder. 
--- -- ---No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Statements 15 42 3 30 15 41 2 33 9 39 -
No Statements 17 58 7 70 22 59 4 67 14 61 2 100 
Total 32 100 10 100 37 100 6 100 23 100 2 100 
-n Data source: Defendant Interview Schedules. 











--No. % No. % 
6 43 2 50 
8 57 2 50 
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analyzed, they did afford us an opportunity to gain an insight into 
the reasons for rejection of counsel and for talking to the police. 
Concerning the right to station-house counsel, one defendant 
did not believe he could really obtain a lawyer at the station. Another 
did not trust a lawyer furnished by the police. "I don't dig those 
jailhouse deals," he said. "The police have their own lawyer. I 
wouldn't be interested." And another added, "I only wanted to 
talk to people I could trust who would let me know what I was up 
against." Other defendants were too preoccupied with other concerns 
to recognize the value of a lawyer. Thus, one noted, "I wasn't think-
ing about anything but calling my mother and wife," and another's 
"main concern was bond." Still others believed that they themselves 
knew the system too well to risk having a lawyer. As one "sophisti-
cated" defendant observed, "I wouldn't want one. That's the worst 
place to have a la,vyer because the police play it straight then. I 
wanted them to make a mistake." 
As for the right to silence, some feared being hit or beaten up 
by the police. Several maintained they had been threatened by the 
police or tricked.11° Another answered questions only because they 
did not relate to the charge against him. Still others wanted to con-
vince police of their innocence. In this regard, a general response 
was that "I saw no harm in it," or that "I had nothing to hide," or 
that "I thought I was not at fault so I talked." One defendant in-
sisted that there is always a tendency for a person to want to co-
operate. And others explained that they would get lenient treat-
ment if they cooperated. As a defendant said, "I figured I could 
straighten out the whole thing right there." Finally, there were 
those who just felt compelled to talk. As one explained, "I did it. 
I knew why the police wanted me, and they had me cold."111 
llO. One defendant talked because he thought the policeman had been kidding. 
111. In addition to studying the relationship of the defendant's cognitive under-
standing or misunderstanding of the warnings of his legal rights to his response to the 
warnings, we also attempted in our Defendant Interview Study to measure the other 
dimensions of understanding by distinguishing between defendants with "anomie" and 
those without "anomie" and differentiating those two defendant groups' societal atti-
tudes and their sense of power or "powerlessness" within the community. 
"Anomie" is a term coined by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, in his work 
Suicide (Spaulding & Simpson transl. 1951). The term may be defined as the inability 
or refusal of an individual to accept the premises and values of his society, and may 
be characterized as an aimless, normless, or ambivalent way of life which often leads to 
various social pathologies. Our study was based on the Nahemow and Bennett mod-
ification of Srole's Anemia Scale devised in the middle fifties. See L. Nahemow & R. 
Bennett, A New Scale for Anomie (1962) (mimeographed paper on file at the New York 
Psychiatric Institute); Srole, Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory 
Study, 21 AM. Soc. R.Ev. 709 (1956). Srole contended that persons with "anomic" tenden-
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In light of the foregoing data on police practices under Miranda 
and the defendants' response, even in an optimum system of precinct 
representation, with well-trained counsel available at the police 
station as soon as a defendant is brought in, the odds against even 
beginning to approach the model established by the Court in 
Miranda would have been exceedingly high. How the attorneys ac-
tually operated after the Junior Bar Section and NLSP established 
the Precinct Representation Project is the next chapter of our story. 
V. THE ATIORNEY's RoLE UNDER MIRANDA 
A. The Court's View 
The basic aim of the Court in Miranda was to "assure that the 
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains un-
fettered throughout the interrogation process."112 The warnings 
by themselves were considered not wholly sufficient in assuring this 
freedom of choice, however, because "the circumstances surrounding 
in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will 
of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators.''113 
How then to protect the individual's right to choose between 
silence and speech from the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation 
process? The solution, which the Court believed to be "indispensable 
to the protection of the Fifth Amendment,''114 was to require the 
presence of counsel during any questioning should the defendant 
so desire.115 If the accused chose to remain silent, the presence of 
the attorney would "reduce the likelihood that the police will prac-
tice coercion,''116 and, if the accused chose to talk, the attorney's pres-
cies are more likely to have pessimistic and cynical views of the world around them 
than persons without "anomic" tendencies. 
"Powerlessness" is a dimension which has also been studied by others. See, e.g., 
Dullough, Alienation in the Ghetto, 72 AM. J. Soc. 469 (1967); Weinstein &: Geisel, 
Family Decision Making Over Desegregation, 25 Soc10111ETRY 21 (1962). In our study, 
we developed two dimensions of powerlessness: (1) the sense of personal powerlessness 
-that one does not control one's own destiny, and (2) the inability to utilize or manip-
ulate the already available, societally sanctioned means of obtaining aid. 
We hypothesized that the distinction based on "anomie" and "powerlessness" would 
also characterize a difference in response by the two defendant groups to the warnings 
of rights given by the police. This study, Zeit, Medalie, &: Alexander, Anomie, Power-
lessness, and Police Interrogation (1968), will be published at a later date. It is currently 
on file with the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure. 
112. 384 U.S. at 469. 
113. 384 U.S. at 469. 
114. 384 U.S. at 469. Preliminary advice alone given to the accused by his own at-
torney was considered insufficient, as well, because, just as the warnings, it could "be 
swiftly over-come by the secret interrogation process." 384 U.S. at 470. 
115. 384 U.S. at 469. 
116. 384 U.S. at 470. 
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ence would enable the accused "to tell his story without fear, ef-
fectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation 
process.''117 The attorney would also be able to give the accused ad-
vice and counsel based on his assessment of the facts and on "the 
good professional judgment he has been taught.''118 Finally, the at-
torney would serve the subsidiary function of enhancing "the in-
tegrity of the fact-finding process in court,"119 by mitigating the 
dangers of untrustworthiness, by offering himself as a witness who 
can testify in court about the coerciveness of the interrogation should 
that have been the case, by guaranteeing "that the accused gives a 
fully accurate statement to the police," and by assuring "that the 
statement is accurately reported by the prosecution at trial."120 
'-
B. The Police Department's Official Response 
Following Miranda, the District of Columbia Police Department 
was faced with the problem of what to do if the accused responded 
to the warnings by stating that he wished counsel. In its General 
Order, the Department required that if the accused wished a la'wyer 
present, the police were to give him the opportunity either to con-
tact his own attorney or to make one availabe by placing a call to 
"one of the volunteer legal agencies" and notify the agency of the 
accused's name and request for counsel.121 Should a requested lawyer 
come to the station house, the police were to afford the accused 
"every reasonable opportunity for confidential consultation.''122 After 
the consultation, if the police deemed interrogation advisable, the 
officer was to repeat the warnings to the accused in the presence of 
counsel and then "proceed with the interrogation unless or until 
terminated by the arrested person.''123 
C. The Precinct Representation Project's Plan for 
Furnishing Volunteer Attorneys 
In response to the Court's call for counsel to protect the ac-
cused's rights under Miranda, the Junior Bar Section published an 
information and orientation "kit" and several supplementary mem-
oranda for use by the attorneys who volunteered for station-house 
117. 384 U.S. at 466. 
118. !184 U.S. at 480. 
II9. 384 U.S. at 466. 
120. 384 U.S. at 470. 
121. General Order No. 9-C, at 4. 
122. Id. 
12!1. Id. 
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duty.m In the kit were several detailed suggestions as to what an 
attorney should do in the police station. 
The initial advice related to the telephone request for counsel. 
If the accused was on the telephone, he was to be advised by the 
attorney "not to talk to the police at all" until the attorney arrived 
at the station; if a police officer placed the call, he was to be requested 
not to interrogate the accused until the attorney arrived and to 
allow the accused to speak on the telephone.125 The volunteer at-
torney was further advised that, once he arrived at the police station, 
he could "usually talk to the arresting officer" and could even "oc-
casionally see the police report which is often being prepared at the 
same time," because the officer was "usually easier to approach at 
this time" than he would be after discussion of the case with a prose-
cuting attorney.126 In his interview with the police officer, the at-
torney was advised to ask whether the accused had been booked, the 
nature of the charge, whether he had been placed and identified 
in a lineup, and whether and when the police intended to take the 
accused before a committing magistrate.127 
The attorney was also to ask the police for a place at the station 
in which he could consult privately with the accused. Upon seeing 
the accused, the attorney was to explain who he was, that he was 
there to provide preliminary legal assistance to the accused free of 
charge, that he was the accused's lawyer and "not provided by the 
police," and that whatever the accused told the attorney would be 
"held in absolute confidence."128 The attorney was also admonished 
to make clear that he was there only "for the limited purpose" of 
helping the accused in the police station and that probably another 
lawyer would handle the case at subsequent stages.129 
124. J. Hennessey &: L. Bernard, Memorandum to Attorneys Participating in the 
Miranda Project, July 13, 1966, in Junior Bar Section, Miranda Kit, July 18, 1966 [here-
inafter Jr. Bar Miranda Kit]; J. Hennessey &: L. Bernard, Suggestions for Volunteer 
Attorneys, Aug. 17, 1966, in Junior Bar Section, Supplement No. 1 to Miranda Kit, 
Aug. 18, 1966 [hereinafter Jr. Bar Supp. No. l]; J. Hennessey&: L. Bernard, Comments 
Addressed to Those Participating in the Miranda Project, in Junior Bar Section, Sup-
plement No. 2 to Miranda Kit, Sept. 30, 1966 [hereinafter Jr. Bar Supp. No. 2]. 
125. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit 6. 
126. Jr. Bar Supp. No. 2, at 3. 
127. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit 6. 
128. The Project memoranda pointed out that "[t]he lawyer's presence and ques-
tions have the effect of 'cementing' the factual situation before memories dim or stories 
change for other reasons." It was also suggested to the attorneys that "[t]he opportu-
nity to observe the physical condition of the defendant may be very important in a 
later trial of the case. If the defendant was cut or bruised, drunk or on narcotics, had 
a mustache or beard, such information might be valuable later on. If the defendant 
is seriously injured, an attorney's urging might be necessary before the police will send 
him to the hospital." Jr. Bar Supp. No. 2, at 3. 
129. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit. 6. If the attorney did not intend to continue representa-
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The attorney's immediate responsibility, the Junior Bar Co--
Directors suggested, was to aid "the accused in deciding how much 
to tell the police."130 To facilitate this aid, the attorney was to as-
certain from the accused what had happened up to then, what state-
ments he had made, what questions the police had asked him, the 
circumstances leading to his requesting a lawyer, the circumstances 
of his arrest, whether he had an alibi, and whether there were wit-
nesses on the scene whom the accused knew might exculpate him. 
The attorney was told to advise the accused of his fifth amend-
ment rights:131 
Explain to him that he may be able to tell the police of his de-
fense and walk freely out of the station but that in explaining his 
story to the police he may become more deeply involved himself; 
that anything he says can be held against him in court .... I£ the 
accused wants to talk to the police, discuss carefully any defense 
he wants to offer. 
I£ the accused wants to tell his story in the hope that he will re-
ceive consideration or better treatment, explain to him that his 
decision does not have to be made immediately. He will have other 
opportunities later in the proceedings to cooperate with the au-
thorities and receive whatever consideration might be given for 
such cooperation. 
I£ after the explanation of his rights the accused wants to offer an 
explanation of his conduct to the police so inform the police and 
state that you desire to be present during the interrogation. 
It was further suggested to the volunteer attorney that he take care-
ful notes of his conversation and of any interrogation in his presence 
since the notes might be necessary to refresh his recollection in the 
future should he be called as a witness.132 
Finally, two additional immediate responsibilities were imposed 
on the volunteer attorney. The first was to bring whatever pressure 
he could "to get the accused before a magistrate as soon as possible 
and to make sure that when there he has a preliminary hearing and 
tion after the precinct stage, he was informed that he could be of assistance to the 
accused by making himself available to the attorney who thereafter represented the 
accused at subsequent stages. Jr. Bar Supp. No. 1, at I. 
130. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit 6. 
131. Id. at 7. In this regard, it was pointed out that: 
Many arrested persons are totally ignorant of our legal procedure; i.e., rights to 
bail, preliminary hearing, appointment of counsel, burden of proof, etc. This 
ignorance puts the arrested person at a great disadvantage, and, even in cases 
where interrogation is not planned, defendants have been known to try and "talk" 
their way out of a charge. The advice of an attorney can do much to overcome 
the problems inherent in this type of situation. 
Jr. Bar Supp. No. 2, at 3. 
132. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit 8. 
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is released from custody under reasonable conditions."183 Second, 
the attorney was to arrange for bond to be set at the police station 
if no magistrate was available and to help the accused to obtain the 
bond once it was set.18¼ 
D. The Actual Operation of the Precinct Representation Project 
I. The Pattern of Defendant Requests and Attorney Responses 
We have already noted that, during its year of operation, the 
Precinct Representation Project had an extremely low number of 
requests for counsel, only 1,157 requests for 1,262 defendants. What 
is even more startling is that the number of requests drastically de-
clined from the first to the second six-month period of operation: 
804 requests for counsel (69 per cent) were made during the first 
six months, whereas only 351 (31 per cent) were made during the 
second six-month period.135 The monthly pattern of counsel requests 
during the year, set forth in table 12, shows clearly the leveling off 
of the requests in December and January, the sudden break and 
decline in February, and the consistently low request rate for the 
rest of the period. 
This pattern of requests for attorneys cannot be explained by 
the mere fact that the fall and winter months are usually low crime 
and arrest months.136 One explanation may be that the police were 
simply reverting to their former practices after the "heat" of the 
first period of post-Miranda operation was off. But this explanation 
does not correlate with experience in other jurisdictions that, during 
the first months of operating under Miranda, police interrogation 
practices were rarely in compliance because they took considerable 
time to work out operational procedures, but that as time went on 
the police practices improved.131 
Another explanation of the request pattern may be that the 
defendants arrested later in the year had learned through the "grape-
vine" that earlier defendants had questioned the value of the services 
provided by the volunteer attorneys.138 They may also have been 
133. Id. at 6-7. 
134. Id. at 7. 
135. Requests not designated by month or year: 2. 
136. See D.C. REPORT 35-36 and table 12 (homicide); id. at 48 and table 25 (rape); 
id at 55, 58 table 37 (robbery); id. at 67-68, 69 table 49 (aggravated assault); id. at 
83, 84 table 65 (housebreaking); id. at 92 & table 72, 93 table 73 (larceny). 
137. See, e.g., Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 64, at 1550-51, & table 3. 
See also Reiss & Black, supra note 63, at 55 n.6. Because of the limitations of our study, 
we were unable to gauge the changes in specific police practices over time. 
138. The limitations of our study made it difficult to measure the changes, if any, 
in defendants' attitudes toward attorneys. 
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TABLE 12 
Telephone Requests for Volunteer Attorneys 
by Month and Y eara 
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Telephone Requests 
Month and Year No. 







Total 1966 804 






Total 1967 351 
Total 1966-1967d 1,155 
a Data source: Telephone Log Records. 
b The Project began operations on June 28, 1966. 
c The Project ended operations on June 27, 1967. 


















aware that the attorneys themselves had become disillusioned, had 
questioned the value of their own services in relationship to the in-
vestment of time put in, and were therefore not participating to as 
great an extent as previously. Such a "feed-back" effect from defen-
dants and attorneys may have produced an aura of low utility about 
the Precinct Representation Project among the District of Columbia 
defendant population. 
There was clearly a change in the response of the attorneys to 
the defendants' requests for counsel during the second six-month 
period. During the first six months of operation, the NLSP switch-
board was able to assign attorneys for at least 725 out of 804 calls 
(90 per cent), whereas during the second six-month period, the 
switchboard was able to assign attorneys for only 248 of the 351 
calls (70 per cent).189 Thus, the falling-off of defendant requests for 
139. Requests not designated by month or year: 2. The difficulty in the Project's 
obtaining volunteer attorneys as time went on is also highlighted by the number of 
attorneys the switchboard had to contact during the first six months of operation in 
order to secure a volunteer for the station house compared with the number of at• 
torneys the switchboard had to contact during the second six months of operation. 
This data is set out in table E-11, Appendix E, infra. 
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attorneys paralleled the falling-off of attorney response to the re-
quests.140 
2. Operational Problems in Servicing the Defendant 
a. Delay between arrest and the attorney's arrival at the station 
house. There was considerable delay between the time a defendant 
was arrested and the time a volunteer attorney arrived at the police 
station. As set out in table 13, 60 per cent of the attorneys arrived 
after a delay of an hour or longer, and almost 9 per cent took four 
or more hours to arrive.141 
TABLE 13 
Time Intervals Between Arrest and the Arrival of the Volunteer 
Attorneys at the Police Stationa 
Time Interval 
from Arrest 
to Arrival No. 
0-15 min. II 
15-30 min. 32 
½· I hr. 73 
1- 2 hrs. 87 
2· 3 hrs. 53 
3· 4hrs. 13 
4+hrs. 27 
Totalb 296 
a Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Not ascertained: 30. 
Attorney Arrivals 
Cummu-









The two major delay intervals were between the time of arrest 
and the time when the attorney received his assignment from the 
NLSP switchboard, and between the time of assignment and the 
time when the attorney arrived at the station. Although over one 
third of the assignments were made within the first half hour, and 
somewhat fewer than two thirds within the first hour, major prob-
lems of servicing the defendants arose with the 21 per cent of attor-
neys who received assignments during the second hour after arrest 
and the remaining 17 per cent who received assignments thereafter.142 
Thus, one attorney complained about the "long delay" between 
140. See text at note 135 and table II supra. 
141. When we speak of a two- or four-hour delay as being "considerable," we mean 
"considerable" in terms of the defendant's needs. Within a relatively short time fol-
lowing arrest or at least following arrival at the police station, the absence of a lawyer 
to protect the defendant's interest proved conducive to police interrogation. 
142. The time delay between arrest and attorney assignment is set out in table E-
12(1), Appendix E infra. Again, of course, the delay is not intrinsically loiig but long 
only in terms of the defendant's needs, 
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the time his defendant was arrested and the time he was called into 
the case; another lamented that it did not make sense to have been 
called to the station house two-and-one-half hours after the defen-
dant had been arrested.148 
Some of the delay between arrest and attorney assignment oc-
curred between the time the NLSP switchboard received the tele-
phone request from the police station and the time it contracted the 
attorneys. One attorney complained that he had not received his 
assignment until four hours after arrest even though the NLSP 
switchboard had been called almost immediately after arrest. And 
a second attorney highlighted the problem that occurred when only 
one attorney was on duty during a particular time period: 
After interview with client, I telephoned NLSP ... to learn of any 
other assignments. I was the only attorney on call that night. I 
telephoned ... several times, but no answer .... I later learned that 
[the operator] had gone out to "lunch" leaving the telephone un-
attended. Had [he] been in, I would have learned of my second 
call .... [I]nstead I drove home! 
For the most part, however, the delay between telephone request 
and attorney assignment was minimal, with only 8 per cent of the 
assignments made one hour or more after the telephone request. 
Attorneys were usually assigned by the NLSP switchboard with 
efficiency and dispatch: 59 per cent of the assignments were made 
within the first five minutes after the switchboard was called; 77 per 
cent within the first fifteen minutes; 85 per cent within the first 
half hour; and 92 per cent within the first hour.144 Most of the delay 
before assignment of the attorney, therefore, came between arrest 
and the placing by police of the telephone request to the NLSP 
switchboard for an attorney. As a result, the police must bear the 
major responsibility for this delay.145 
b. Delay at the station house. Once the attorneys arrived at the 
police station, two additional sources of delay were present. First 
was the practice of transferring the defendant to Precinct No. 1 for 
booking and identification before the attorney arrived at the sta-
tion.146 For example, one attorney reported twice traveling all the 
143. See note 104 supra. 
144. The time delay between the telephone request for an attorney and the assign-
ment of the attorney is set forth in table E-12(2), Appendix E, infra. 
145. Unfortunately, few attorneys could or did obtain documentation of this type 
of delay. As one of the attorneys pointed out, "[N]o explanation was given why there 
was a substantial delay between arrest and [the] time [the] request for [a] lawyer was 
made.'' 
146. Precinct No. I is the central cell-block for all those arrested in the District of 
Columbia. It is normal operational procedure for defendants to be transferred to No. I, 
at least when no United States Commissioner or Committing Magistrate is available 
for presentment. 
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way across town only to find that "both times the accused had been 
moved from the precinct" before the attorney arrived. However, 
we found no evidence to sustain the conclusion that this was a pur-
poseful device used by the police to hinder the attorney. 
The second opportunity for delay at the station occurred between 
the arrival of the attorney and the time he obtained access to the 
defendant. Although 80 per cent of the attorneys saw their clients 
within five minutes, and an additional 6 per cent within fifteen min-
utes, 12 per cent of the attorneys were delayed between fifteen min-
utes and an hour before they could see their clients, and another 2 
per cent were delayed for an hour or more.147 Again, just as with the 
delay before the telephone request for an attorney, the police must 
bear the major responsibility for delay at the station house. 
The delay we have documented constituted one of the "real" 
problems of the Precinct Representation Project, as one of the 
attorneys reported. By the time an attorney arrives at the station, 
he said, "the chances are that he [the defendant] has been talked to 
by the officers." This observation is borne out by a fact we have 
already noted: that over half of the defendants requesting counsel 
were interrogated by the police upon arrest and at the station house 
before the attorneys arrived at the station house.148 
c. Telephonic communication between attorney and defendant. 
Perhaps the time delays could have been mitigated had there been 
direct telephonic communication between the defendant and at-
torney at an early stage. The General Order, however, directed that 
only the police themselves should call "one of the volunteer legal 
agencies" if the accused asked for an attorney.149 As a result, once the 
NLSP switchboard was in operation, 888 out of 1,037 telephone 
requests (86 per cent) were placed by police officers, and only 135 
(13 per cent) were placed by the defendants themselves.150 
Even the defendants who called received little immediate satis-
faction since no advice was or could be given by the switchboard 
operator. As with the calls from the police, the switchboard opera-
tor's only task was to contact the attorney on duty. The attorney 
in turn had been advised by the Project's supervisors to ask the 
147. The time delay between the arrival of the attorney at the station house and 
the attorney's consultation with the defendant is set forth in Table E-12(3), Appendix 
E, infra. 
148. See Part III.B.2. supra. 
149. General Order No. 9-C, at 4. This directive was strongly criticized by Julian 
Dugas, head of NLSP, "Vve don't want the police calling us up .••. We don't want 
defendants to get us identified as policemen's lawyers." Washington Post, July 20, 1966, 
at C-1, col. 2. 
150. The remaining fourteen calls were placed by relatives, friends, and other mem-
bers of the public. Data source: Telephone Log Records. Not ascertained: 120. 
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police by telephone not to interrogate the defendant, and to speak 
to the defendant himself in order to advise him not to talk to the 
police until the attorney arrived.151 Had the attorneys followed this 
advice, they might have been able to mitigate the consequences of 
the delay in their seeing the defendants. Unfortunately, only twenty-
two attorneys (7 per cent) had telephone conversations with their 
clients before they departed for the police station. The remaining 
295 (93 per cent) had no conversations whatsoever.152 
3. The Services Performed by the Attorney at the Station House 
Once the attorneys arrived at the police station, only twenty-
five (8 per cent) spent more than an hour with the accused, and six 
(2 per cent) more than two hours. On the other hand, a substantial 
number of attorneys-seventy-nine (27 per cent)-spent no more 
than fifteen minutes, and six (2 per cent) actually spent no more 
than five minutes, with the defendants. The findings on the time 
spent by the attorneys are set out in table 14. 
TABLE 14 






½· 1 hour 











a Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 










a. Legal rights warnings and advice. The limited time spent 
with defendants by over one quarter of the attorneys, while con-
ceivably sufficient to fulfill the minimum constitutional require-
ments imposed by Miranda, did not seem sufficient for the attorneys 
to provide many of the other services suggested in the Junior Bar 
Section's own Miranda Kit.153 Thus, one third of the seventy-nine 
attorneys who spent fifteen minutes or less at the police station 
reported confining their legal services solely to the giving of legal 
151. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit 6; see text accompanying note 125 supra. 
152. Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. Not ascertained: 9. 
153. Jr. Bar Miranda Kit 6-7; see text accompanying notes 130-34 supra. 
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rights warnings, including at times advice to the defendant to re-
main silent. This limited service was also performed by another 
117 out of the total of 311 volunteer attorneys reporting (38 per 
cent); an additional 172 attorneys (55 per cent) also reported giving 
legal rights warnings and advice along with other services.154 
b. Interrogation of the defendant in the attorney's presence and 
thereafter. The limited time spent by the attorneys at the station 
and the restricted services provided were symptomatic of the at-
torneys' declining interest in the Precinct Representation Project 
as time went on. A number of attorneys felt that they were serving 
little purpose in going down to the station house: some believed 
that they could serve no useful function because their defendants 
had been "caught in the act," or because the cases were unimportant, 
or because the police had no intention of interrogating their de-
fendants. As one attorney stated: 
I draw the line at getting out of bed at 2:00 a.m. on a bitterly cold, 
snowy night and driving 20 minutes to advise a man arrested for 
vagrancy ... of his rights against self-incrimination when the police 
have no conceivable reason for or intention of interrogating him. 
Will these men ever be assigned counsel at their trial? I don't 
think the Miranda decision contemplated this situation, and I 
believe it an imposition to take my time to consult with persons 
arrested for petty misdemeanors.155 
Another attorney reported: 
I found it a most frustrating experience. The accused was never 
questioned by police at any time. The accused asked for an attorney 
to be comforted more than anything else. I was happy to do this 
but I feel it is not the intent of Miranda £or the Bar to undertake 
this function. The police could have advised him of the matters 
I discussed with the accused. His wife should have been there to 
comfort him. 
This general feeling was articulated most succinctly by the 
Junior Bar Section's Project Co-Directors, who concluded after three 
months of experience with the Project "that very few interrogations 
154. Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. Not ascertained: 15. 
155. Whether or not a particular offense was covered by the .Miranda requirements 
depended upon whether or not a particular police officer thought it was, and, occa-
sionally, as in this case, an officer would give the Miranda warnings even when va-
grancy or some other petty misdemeanor was involved. As to the question of the types 
of offenses covered by the fifth amendment, see Y. Kamisar, Commentary, in A NEW 
LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: EsCOBEDO-THE SECOND ROUND 108-09 (B. George ed. 1967); Ka-
misar &: Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 68-73 (1963). 
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are taking place and that the number of confessions has been sub-
stantially reduced."156 Specifically, they noted that: 
[I]n the vast majority (over 95%) of these cases, the police have not 
continued the interrogation of the accused after counsel has been 
contacted. This indicates that the problem, of coerced confessions 
which prompted the Supreme Court to establish the procedural 
safeguards listed in Miranda may have been minimized in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.157 
This assessment conflicted with what both the volunteer attorneys 
and the defendants had reported to our research staff. It may be 
that in "over 95%" of the cases, the police had "not continued" 
interrogation "after counsel had been contacted." Yet, as we noted 
in part III, prior to contacting the attorneys and clearly before the 
attorneys arrived, there was a substantial incidence of police interro-
gation and of statements given by defendants. 
But this problem aside, failure of the police to continue interro-
gation led many volunteer attorneys to believe that Miranda did 
not require their token attendance at the station house. .AJ,, stated 
by the Junior Bar Project Co-Directors: 
[S]ome volunteer attorneys ... feel that if the police do not intend 
to interrogate, the attorney can serve no useful function by traveling 
many miles late at night to visit an accused at the precinct station. 
These volunteers have suggested that when a call is received, the 
attorney telephones the precinct, advises the accused of his rights 
and inquires of the officers whether they desire to conduct further 
interrogation. If the police do not wish to interrogate the accused, 
these attorneys feel that the obligation imposed by Miranda will 
have been fulfilled without the necessity for an across town journey 
and lengthy interview by an unpaid volunteer .... 10s 
This same view was reported by the Chairman of the Junior Bar 
Section, in the course of announcing the termination of the Junior 
Bar's participation in the Precinct Representation Project, effective 
June 27, 1967: 
The Junior Bar Committee discovered that apparently in very 
few cases where counsel responded to calls from the precincts did 
the police actually intend to question the arrested person about 
the charge after the lawyer appeared. Consequently, so far as 
making counsel available in situations where the Miranda case had 
held that counsel was constitutionally required, the program's impact 
seemed to be quite limited.159 
156. Jr. Bar Supp. No. 2, at 3. 
157. Id. at 2. 
158. Id. at 2. 
159. Letter of S. White Rhyne, Jr., Chairman, Junior Bar Section, to Howard West-
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One trouble with the Committee's discovery had previously been 
raised by the Junior Bar Project Co-Directors themselves who had 
emphasized that it was unknown "how many interrogations might 
have been continued had not lawyers actually shown up at the 
station house; or, if a telephone call rather than a personal appear-
ance would have been as effective as the personal appearance."160 
Moreover, according to 31 I of the attorneys' own Volunteer Reports, 
interrogation in their presence actually took place in 36 cases (12 per 
cent),161 and, in 22 out of the 219 cases reported (10 per cent), the 
defendants gave statements to the police even after having been 
advised by their attorneys to remain silent.162 
The dilemma raised by the juxtaposition of the realities of in-
terrogation against the attorneys' assessment of their role is a very 
real one. Unless the lawyer is at the police station when an interro-
gation takes place, the defendant is very likely to waive his rights to 
silence and give incriminatory statements; yet since the police have 
need to interrogate only a limited number of suspects, providing a 
lawyer for each person arrested, or even for each person who requests 
counsel, makes the lawyer feel that he is wasting his time. 
c. A id in pretrial release. The Precinct Representation Project 
showed that the attorney at the station house could perform many 
valuable non-.Miranda services. A major service reported by the 
volunteer attorneys was the giving of some aid or advice concerning 
wood, Chairman, NLSP Board of Directors, May 15, 1967, at 2, in J. F. Hennessey, 
Memorandum to All Volunteers Participating in the Miranda Project, May 15, 1967. 
160. Jr. Bar Supp. No. 2, at 3. 
161. In sixteen of these cases (44%), the interrogation was not related specifically to 
the arrest and offense charged, however. Not ascertained: 15. 
162. Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. Not ascertained: 107. There may be 
serious underreporting on this point, since 215 out of 303 attorneys (71 %) indicated 
that they had not "maintained an active interest in the case" and presumably were 
therefore in no position to learn of statements after they left the police station. 
Of the twenty-two defendants who gave the statements, twenty-one (95%) reported 
having previously been given warnings by the police; fifteen (68%) reported having 
been previously interrogated by the police and eleven (50%) were reported by the 
police to have been previously interrogated; twelve (55%) said they had been previously 
interrogated in the attorney's presence; and thirteen (59%) stated that they had given 
previous statements, five of which (38%) had been inculpatory and six (46%), excul-
patory. Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
These facts concerning interrogation and confession should put into perspective the 
statement by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 n.12 
(1966): 
The Court's vision of a lawyer "mitigat[ing] the dangers of untrustworthiness" 
••• by witnessing coercion and assisting accuracy in the confession is largely a 
fancy; for if counsel arrives, there is rarely going to be a police station confession. 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (separate opinion of Jackson, J.): "[A]ny lawyer 
worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to 
police under any circumstances." See Enker &: Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect, 49 
Minn. L. Rev. 47, 66-68 (1964). 
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bail, bond, or personal recognizance in 94 out of 311 cases (28 per 
cent).163 If the defendant had his mm financial resources or had 
friends or relatives with money, the attorney was often of help in 
having station-house bond set and in raising the premium for bail. 
When the accused was to be brought before a magistrate in the 
morning following a night-time arrest, however, bond for a few 
hours freedom proved to be a very expensive luxury for the indigent. 
The real injustice was to those indigents who would be released on 
their mm recognizance once they were brought before a magistrate: 
because of the unavailability of committing magistrates, some indi-
gent defendants had to remain in jail over night or even over the 
weekend, and the volunteer attorneys were powerless to do anything 
about it. 
The potential value of assistance in pretrial release was recog-
nized by the Committee of the Junior Bar Section responsible for 
the Project; unfortunately little could be done to realize the po-
tential. As the Committee noted: 
[E]xperience gained under the program, particularly in the case of 
arrests early in the weekend (where the person would ordinarily 
be held in jail without presentment until Monday morning), showed 
that counsel could perform a valuable service in arranging for 
prompt release on bail or personal recognizance. This became par-
ticularly important after the effective date of the Bail Reform Act 
in September, 1966. It also became apparent that representation at 
this stage could provide an opportunity for an early factual inquiry 
which might be useful at later stages of the case. This emphasized 
the need for having a judicial officer, capable of fixing bail as well 
as assigning counsel and holding preliminary hearings, physically 
present at a readily-accessible location.164 
d. Other services. Another major service reported by attorneys 
was contacting friends or relatives in 141 cases (45 per cent). Addi-
tional services reported included (1) offering to become permanent 
counsel, (2) helping defendants obtain medical assistance, (3) noti-
fying the defendant's probation officer or commanding officer of 
his arrest, (4) advising the defendant to ask for permanent counsel 
at arraignment, and (5) obtaining exculpatory witnesses.165 
4. The Voluntary Nature of the Project 
The basic defect of the Precinct Representation Project was that 
it was a voluntary program. It was developed and conducted by a 
163. Data source: Voluntary Attorney Reports. Not ascertained: 15. 
164. Letter, supra note 159, at 2. The Bail Reform Act is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 
3141-43, 3146-52, 3568 (Supp. II, 1966). See also District of Columbia Bail Agency Act, 
D.C. ConE ANN. §§ 23-901 to 23-909 (1967). 
165. Data source: Defendant Interview Schedules. 
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small group of attorneys, who had taken the initiative to establish 
an interim program, provide orientation materials, recruit attorneys, 
and keep the program going. Because of its limited budget, it could 
not orient and train the voluntary attorneys aside from providing 
the /1.f iranda Kit and the two supplementary memoranda. Indeed, as 
time went on, there was little money left even for reproducing the 
Kit and mailing it out to new volunteers in the program. After the 
initial effort, coordination of the project became less effective and 
the voluntary effort by the lawyers began to slack off. 
The voluntary nature of the program also created other problems. 
Because of other professional obligations, most of the volunteers 
were unable to represent the accused at subsequent hearings or trials. 
There was thus a lack of continuity in representation, which may 
have been detrimental when the attorney representing the accused 
at the police precinct had information which was not available to 
the counsel who represented the accused in subsequent stages of 
the proceedings. This information-details about arrest, police prac-
tices, witnesses, and evidence-was not systematically preserved by 
the Project for the latter attorneys. Indeed, one of the major com-
plaints by the attorneys themselves was that "there should be some 
coordination between representation at the precinct and representa-
tion in court." As one attorney put it: 
Some arrangements should be made so that the stationhouse at-
torney can refer the client to an attorney for preliminary hearing, 
if he doesn't want to go to hearing himself. Otherwise, the accused 
feels that he is being dismissed back into the system he doesn't 
understand. 
Furthermore, the Project was a severe strain on the full-time 
practicing attorneys who volunteered for service. On some Saturday 
nights, a single attorney would be called down to one or the other 
of the police stations ten or more times during his tour of duty. 
Despite these problems and deficiencies in the Project, what 
is remarkable is that the Project was sustained over such a long time 
by so many attorneys who gave freely of their time and effort even 
though many of them were carrying on full-time law practices during 
the day-time hours. At the same time, however, such an interim pro-
gram could not continue indefinitely. Some more permanent ar-
rangement had to be made. This need was explained by S. While 
Rhyne, Jr., Chairman of the Junior Bar Section in his letter an-
nouncing the termination of the Junior Bar's participation in the 
Project: 
The precinct representation project program of the Junior Bar 
was conceived and carried out as an interim effort. It would be 
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unwise, in our opinion, for any permanent system of providing 
prompt legal representation after arrest to depend on such a massive 
effort by private attorneys who have full court and office schedules 
during the day and nevertheless commit themselves to respond 
without compensation to calls in the middle of the night and on 
weekends.166 
VI. MIRANDA IN PERSPECTIVE 
A. Summary of Findings 
That the response of the police, defendants, and · attorneys to 
Miranda did not conform to the ideal envisioned by the Court 
should come as no surprise. "Life and history," said Carl Becker, 
"have an inveterate habit of betraying the ideal aspirations of men . 
. . . [M]en were sure to be neither so rational nor so well-intentioned 
as the ideology conceived them to be."167 
I. The Police 
In contrast to the first premise underlying the Court's decision 
in Miranda that the police would give adequate and effective warn-
ings of legal rights and honor the accused's exercise of those rights, 
the police in fact were reported to have failed to observe the spirit 
and often the letter of Miranda. Half the defendants reported not 
being given the silence warning, somewhat fewer than two thirds 
reported not being given the station-house counsel warning, and 
over two thirds as not being given all four Miranda warnings. Half 
the defendants said they had been interrogated by the police and 
even half of those requesting counsel maintained they had been 
interrogated before the attorneys arrived. Much of this interrogation 
and the concomitant eliciting of incriminatory statements occurred 
at the time and place of arrest where no lawyer could be present. 
Few defendants who stated they had been interrogated and had given 
statements signed any formal waiver of their rights. And, formal 
waiver or not, a significant number of those who gave statements 
under interrogation could not have given any knowing and intelli-
gent waiver because of their failure to understand the warnings. 
2. The Defendants 
In contrast to the second premise that the defendants would be 
able to have a sufficient basis from the warnings to decide in their 
166. Letter, supra note 159, at 3. 
167. c. BEC!tll, MODERN DEMOCRACY llll (1941). 
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own best interest whether to remain silent and to choose counsel, 
the defendants were loathe to use attorneys and frequently gave 
statements to the police because of their inability to apply Miranda 
to their own circumstances. Over nine tenths of those arrested for 
felonies and serious misdemeanors did not request counsel; nor did 
well over three quarters of those who said they had not been given 
the station-house counsel warning, over one third of those who stated 
they had been given the warning, or over one third of those who 
reported having been given the warning and having understood it. 
Moreover, two fifths of the defendants interviewed said they had 
given statements to the police. The defendants who gave statements 
constituted over one half of those who stated they had not been given 
the silence warning, two fifths of those who reported having been 
given the warning, and over two fifths who said they had been 
given the warning and understood it. 
3. The Attorneys 
Finally, in contrast to the third premise that the presence of 
attorneys in the police station would protect defendants' fifth amend-
ment rights, the attorneys found it difficult to define adequately their 
role at the station house. They were often unavailable at the critical 
point in time necessary to protect the defendants' rights because of 
the delays between the time of arrest and the time the attorney 
arrived at the station and because of the reported failure of the 
police to curb interrogation until the defendant could have access 
to an attorney. Moreover, because so few attorneys even thought of 
telephoning the defendant directly before setting out for the station 
house and because so many spent so short a time with the defendant 
once there, little headway was made in mitigating the consequences 
of the time delays and police practices. 
B. Conclusions 
I. The Police 
No warnings of rights and no program of providing attorneys 
to defendants, regardless of how good, can be of much value if the 
police persist in interrogating suspects at the time and place of 
arrest where the right to an attorney cannot be realized. The least 
that should be expected is that the police be required to refrain 
from all attempts to conduct custodial interrogation until the de-
fendants have the "continuous opportunity to exercise" their fifth 
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amendment rights.168 As the Court in Miranda emphasized, "If 
authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a 
reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is 
carried out, they may do so without violating the person's Fifth 
Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during 
that time.''169 
Another minimum requirement should obviously be that the 
police give all-and not only some-of the Miranda warnings, clearly 
and in a neutral manner, to all defendants subjected to custodial in-
terrogation before that interrogation begins. The Court believed 
that warnings given in this manner would afford a defendant the 
opportunity of making a meaningful decision whether or not to 
request counsel and to remain silent. Although our data have cast 
serious doubt on the validity of this premise in all cases, it is the law 
and retains sufficient rationality to make adherence mandatory. 
2. The Defendants 
In our study we found that, aside from the large number of 
defendants who understood the warnings and acted accordingly, a 
small group of defendants misunderstood the warnings and a sig-
nificant percentage, who had a cognitive understanding of the warn-
ings, nevertheless failed to appreciate their significance and lacked 
the ability of applying them in context. 
Our findings are not unique. A recent study of noncustodial 
interrogation of draft protestors who were highly educated and in-
telligent middle-class college students and professors at Yale shows 
that the results of giving Miranda warnings and of subsequent in-
terrogation were comparable to our own: 
Even though the suspects understood that they could refuse to 
answer whenever they chose, they had only the vaguest intuition 
about how to decide whether to answer a given question. Their 
decision whether to waive their right to remain silent was made 
on hunch alone, without any of the knowledge or understanding 
required to make it "knowing and intelligent." Their waiver of the 
right to a lawyer's advice was even less informed, since their igno-
rance of the significance of the right to silence was compounded by 
their ignorance of the functions a lawyer might have performed for 
them.110 
168. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
169. 384 U.S. at 474. This prohibition was not intended to affect "[g]eneral on-the-
scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citi-
zens in the fact-finding process •..• " 384 U.S. at 477. 
170. Griffiths &: Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft 
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 311 (1967). Griffiths and Ayres further pointed out that: 
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It is obvious that the problem of comprehension of the Miranda 
warnings posed at Yale could not have been cured regardless of how 
clear, concise, and neutral the warnings were. One reason suggested 
in the Yale study was that the law enforcement officers 
cannot be expected to give the warnings in a sympathetic way or 
to assure full comprehension and appreciation in the suspect. It 
is hardly realistic to expect an interrogator to have the solicitude 
for the interest of the suspect which is required if the suspect is to 
be able to appreciate the significance of his rights in the context of 
what is at stake in the interrogation. To ask a detective ... to act 
both as interrogator and as counsel for the defense is to require a 
capacity for schizophrenia as a qualification for the job.171 
What then may be done to help defendants develop not only a 
cognitive understanding of their rights during interrogation but also 
an appreciation of the significance of those rights? One method 
devised at Yale was to mount an intensive campaign which included 
newspaper and posted notices of legal rights as well as a mass meeting 
at which Yale law professors discussed in detail the legal rights of 
persons subjected to police interrogation. At the meeting, the pro-
fessors 
explained some of the working of the criminal process, clarifying 
the possible uses to which information gathered by the FBI might 
be put. They discussed the possible objectives of the questioning, 
the functions a lawyer could perform for a person trying to decide 
whether and what to answer, and the necessity that a person decide 
what his goals are before seeking legal advice as to how to ac-
complish them. Those present were told that they could phone a des-
ignated extension to obtain the numbers of local ACLU lawyers 
who would be willing to represent them. Questions of strategy were 
then debated at some length, and the sense of the meeting became 
clear that talking to the FBI could serve no useful purpose and 
might conceivably be harmfu1.112 
As a result of the meeting, "highly-educated suspects seem[ ed] able-
in a non-custodial interrogation conducted according to Miranda 
rules-to exercise their constitutional rights fairly effectively, and, 
when in the absence of a lawyer, to behave as most lawyers would 
One of the prime reasons why the suspects ••• answered the questions •.. 
was that they did not appreciate the reasons for remaining silent. Because • • • 
they lacked knowledge of the legal context of the decisions they faced, they could 
not make an informal choice whether to exercise their rights, even though they 
were more or less aware of the literal meaning of the statements on the waiver 
form. 
Id. at 313. 
171. Id. at 309-10. 
172. Id. at 303. 
1398 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:1347 
probably have counseled."173 Indeed, so important did the Yale study 
show this preparatory education of rights to be that, without it, the 
Miranda warnings proved "wholly ineffective, and this was so even 
when the suspect was intelligent, and the interrogation was polite, 
non-custodial, and at the suspect's home."17~ 
The Yale experience has shown that an intensive campaign in 
which people are oriented to their rights before they come into 
conflict with the law may prove effective in implementing the pur-
poses of Miranda. Attorneys from the local bar association and the 
local neighborhood legal services project could serve a valuable 
function in this educational role. But would this type of educational 
program be sufficiently effective with the type of poorly educated, 
indigent defendant usually involved in street crimes as it had been 
with the highly educated and intelligent middle-class students and 
professors involved in the Yale study? Despite the extremely favor-
able situation at Yale, the study there ultimately concluded that, 
"for full achievement of Miranda's values, a suspect needs even more 
than a sympathetic explanation before his interrogation-he needs 
a sympathetic advocate during the interrogation."175 Obviously, no 
less should be required for poorly educated, indigent defendants. 
3. The Attorneys 
But what type of attorney and what kind of legal program would 
satisfy the requirements of Miranda? Clearly, as the Precinct Repre-
sentation Project demonstrated, a program of volunteer attorneys is 
inadequate to meet the challenge on a permanent basis. As a result 
of that experience, the Junior Bar sponsors recommended "that the 
most efficient way of providing legal counsel upon arrest would be in 
connection with a prompt presentment before a committing magis-
trate, available at a downtown location on a 24-hour basis."176 
Counsel could then be quickly appointed by a judicial officer to 
represent the defendant. This proposal was ultimately embodied in 
a recommendation by many prominent agencies and groups in the 
District of Columbia to establish a night court.177 An experimental 
night court in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions 
was put into effect from October 2 to December 29, 1967. Unfortu-
nately, whatever its other merits, the night court did not solve the 
173. Id. at 312. 
174. Id. at 318. 
175. Id. 
176. Letter, supra note 159, at 2. 
177. See id.; D.C. REPORT 283, 364, 956 n.142. 
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basic problem of protecting the accused's fifth amendment rights 
immediately after arrest, during which, as we have seen, a large 
portion of police interrogation was said to have taken place. 
Another, and perhaps more relevant, proposal made by the 
Junior Bar was that "a permanent system should provide counsel 
who are able to devote full time and attention to continuous repre-
sentation as a part of their regular duties."178 Obviously, this system 
of adequately compensated counsel at the station house, supported 
by public funds, would not have to depend on the devotion and 
willingness of only a few lawyers to help out but would make provi-
sion for counsel responsive to the needs of the defendants. The 
"permanent system" would still have the same problem of time 
delays as the Precinct Representation Project had, however, unless 
counsel was in fact present from the time the defendant arrived at 
the station. 
How feasible is such a system of full-time counsel to fulfill the 
Miranda requirements? The National Crime Commission's Task 
Force on the Administration of Justice has noted that, "at a time 
when reform of the criminal process is essential and legal manpower 
needs are acute, there are not enough competent criminal lawyers 
available to serve even those defendants who can afford to retain 
counsel."170 If this be true, where could one hope to develop a corps 
of full-time Ia-wyers to handle Miranda problems in the manner 
required? 
Without enough well-trained criminal attorneys to go around, 
perhaps the alternative is to look to the law schools which represent 
a substantial, almost untapped source of legal manpower. In a legal 
program operating out of a legal aid or public defender agency 
under supervision of faculty and agency lawyers, law students could 
assume the role of legal counsel at the police station.180 Such a pro-
gram would provide "invaluable training under proper supervi-
sion,"181 improve legal representation, and help to relieve the legal 
manpower shortage.182 By utilizing the judgment of several well-
178. Letter, supra note 159, at 3. 
179. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 57 (1967); see Silverstein, Manpower Requirements 
in the Administration of Criminal Justice, in id. at 152-61 (Appendix D). 
180. No serious legal problem should arise in qualifying the students to play the 
role of counsel. According to the National Crime Commission Report, "[i]n at least 
nine [now thirteen] States, third-year law students are permitted by law to represent 
indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors at trial." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY 152 (1967). 
181. Id. 
182. See id. 
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chosen attorneys and faculty members experienced in criminal law 
who would serve as supervisors, the law student program could avoid 
the disabilities of a program composed entirely of full-time attorneys 
who are not in sufficient supply to fulfill the need. By harnessing the 
enthusiasm and vitality of law students to whom the station house 
could serve as a challenge rather than a menial task, the program 
could avoid the disabilities of a volunteer program of private attor-
neys who have full court and office schedules with insufficient time 
to devote nights and weekends to servicing defendants under 
Miranda. 
None of these recommendations for improving the implementa-
tion of Miranda is a panacea, of course. Just as with the original 
attempt to implement Miranda, a subsequent attempt along the 
lines suggested will hardly be the ultimate solution. One can hope, 
however, that a curbing of the more egregious police practices, an 
educational campaign by the bar to help sensitize the citizenry to 
their legal rights, and the use of the law students in the station house 
to help the legal manpower problem may help alleviate some of the 
difficulties in implementing Miranda. 
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PRECINCT REPRES~NTATION P~OJECT 
V0L.UNT,EER ATTORNEY REPORT 
DATE I FOR OFFICE USE ONL.Y 
ATTORNEY I, o. No, I AccusED 1. o. No, 
NAME OF ATTORNEY AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE OR MORE): NLS, O,C, BAR, JR, BAR, FED, BAR, 
WASH, BAR, WOMEN'S BAR, INTERN, OTHERS, 
NAME OF ACClJSED CHARGES 
DATE OF ARREST --1 TIME I 0ATE ASSIGNMENT RECEIVED 
DID YOU SPEAK WITH THE ACCUSED BY TEL.EPHONE 9EFORE YOU LEFT FOR THE PRECINCT STATION? 0 YES 
IF YES, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF' YOUR CONVERSATION: 
To WHICH PRECINCT DID YOU GO? IME OF ARRIVAL AT STATION: 
How FAR THROUGH THE ROUTINE POLICE PROCEDURE WAS THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME OF YOUR ARRIVAL? □ NONE 
0 OTHER (SPECIFY) 
TIME PRISONER MADE AVAILABL.E FOR INTERVIEW WITH ATTORNEY: 
I TIME 
0 No IF NO, PL.EASE EXPLAIN, 
0 BOOKING □ 1,0, SECTION 
PLEASE EXPLAIN ANY LENGTHY DELAY BETWEEN THE TIME OF YOUR ARRIVAL AT THE STATION AND YOUR MEETING WITH THE ACCUSED, 
DID YOU DISCUSS THE CASE WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICER? □ YES □ No 
DID THE POLICE ADMIT INTERROGATING THE ACCUSED? □ YES □ No 
WERE YOU ADLE TO SECURE PRIVACY WITH THE ACCUSED? □ YES □ No 
THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH THE ACCUSED PLEASE DETERMINE: 































HAD THE POLICE IHTERROGATED THE ACCUSED IN ANY MANNER PRIOR TO YOUR ARRIVAL? □ NO □ YES ll' YES, WHERE AND WHEN HAD THE PRISONER DEEN 
QUESTIONED? □ AT ARREST □ 1H SQUAD CAR □ AT PRECINCT STATION OAT 1.0, SECTION O OTHER (SPECll'Y) • 
HAD THE ACCUSED UTTERED ANY STATEMCHTS DURING IHTERROGATI0N7 0 NO O YES □ ExCULPAT0RY O INCULPAT0RY O NEUTRAL 
DID ADDITIONAL INTERROGATION TAKE PLACE IN YOUR PRESENCE? □ No 0 YES (PLEASE DETAIL) 
TIME IHTERVIEW CONCLUDED: I WHAT WAS THC NATURE 01' YOUR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE? 
0 ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING p0ND O C0HTACT FRIENDS OR RELATIVES O OTHER (PLEASE DETAIL) 
DID THE ACCUSED MAKE ANY STATEMEHTS AFTER YOU ADVISED HIM TO REMAIN SILEHT? 0 YES □ No 
WHAT WAS THE POLICE REACTION TO YOUR PRESENCE? 0 FAVORABLE D NEUTRAL 0 UNFAVORABLE 
WERE OTHER PRISONERS PRESEHTED TO YOU FOR ADVICE AND CONSULTATION DURING YOUR STAY AT THE STATI0NH0USE? 
(IF SO, PLEASE FILL OUT ADDITIONAL FORMS FOR EACH ONE.) 
D WARNINGS 
□ No 0 YES NUMBER: 
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION USED ON VISIT, 0 PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE HAVE YOU M~IHTAINED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THIS CASE? □ Yes □ No 
MILEAGE: 0 Bus 0 TAXI FARE: 
NUMBER OF PHONE CALLS MADE IN THE COURSE OF YOUR VISIT~ 
NATURE OF OTHER EXPENSES: I TOTAL EXPENSES: 
DID YOU MAKE ANY DETERMINATION OF INDIGENCY? □ No □ YES, INFORMAL □ · YES, FORMAL 
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APPENDIX C 
Defendant Interview Schedule• 
PART IV 
What date were you arrested? 
What time of day were you arrested? 
Where were you arrested? 
Did you know why you were being arrested? 
Did the police tell you the reason you were being arrested? 
Did they have a warrant for your arrest? 
[Vol. 66:1347 
What did the policeman say to you when you were arrested? 
How many policemen arrested you? 
Was anybody else arrested with you? 
Did you talk with the arresting policeman (men) at all? 
INTERVIEWER: ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION OF ALL DE-
FENDANTS. TAKE STATEMENT VERBATIM AND CODE ANSWER 
LATER IN COLUMNS 23 THROUGH 33. 
When you got to the police station, what happened then? 
Coding for verbatim statements. 
Were you told of your legal rights? 
When were you first told? 
·where? (were you told) 
Who told you? 
How many times were you told? 
Did anyone say that you didn't have to say anything to the police at 
any time? 
Did anyone say that you didn't have to answer police questions? 
Did anyone tell you that if you couldn't afford a lawyer, one could be 
appointed when you went to Court? 
Did anyone tell you that you had the right to have a lawyer appointed 
at the police station? 
Did anyone tell you that if you could not afford a lawyer, you would be 
given the phone number of a free one? 
Were you told that your lawyer could be with you at the police station 
and that he could consult with you? 
Did anyone tell you about any other legal rights? 
Were you given the name of a lawyer? 
(Specify) 
Were you given a lawyer's phone number? 
Were you told about other legal services? Which ones? 
Did they put these rights down in writing? 
Were you asked to sign the paper on which your rights were set down? 
Did you sign it? 
Did you read it before you signed it? 
INTERVIEWER: ASK THE FOLLOWING TWO QUESTIONS ONLY 
OF RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THAT THE POLICE DID NOT IN-
FORM THEM OF ANY RIGHT. 
You have said that the police did not inform you that you had legal 
rights under the circumstances. Did you think that you had any rights? 
IF THE ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION IS "YES,'' THEN 
ASK ... 
What did you think your rights were under the circumstances? 
IF THE RESPONDENT INDICATED KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIGHT 
TO SILENCE, OR WAS INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT, AND ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER, THEN ASK ..• 
• Columns are not in order due to the unpredictable development of the schedule 
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'Why, if you knew you had the right to remain silent, would you talk 
with the arresting officers? 
IF THE RESPONDENT WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD RIGHTS, THEN 
ASK WHAT HE THOUGHT THE POLICE MEANT WHEN THEY 
SAID. . • • [Probe first those rights mentioned to the respondent.] 
THEN, FOR RESPONDENTS NOT INFORMED OF RIGHTS, OR 
THOSE PARTIALLY INFORMED, ASK: WHAT DO YOU THINK 
THE POLICE WOULD HAVE MEANT IF THEY SAID .•.• [Note 
whether respondent was actually told or is hypothesizing.] 
"You have been placed under arrest. You are not required to say anything 
to us at any time, or to answer any questions. Anything you say may be 
used against you as evidence in Court." 
"You may call a lawyer, or a relative, or a friend." 
"Your lawyer may be present here while we question you, and you may 
talk (consult) with him." 
ONLY ONE OF NEXT THREE QUESTIONS ARE [sic] TO BE ASKED. 
SELECT THE APPROPRIATE WARNING (DEPENDING ON WHICH 
ONE WAS GIVEN) FROM THE NEXT THREE COLUMNS: ASK 
ONLY THAT ONE. [If respondent was not told any of the three, ask 
Col. 52 hypothetically.] 
"If you cannot obtain a lawyer, one may be appointed for you, when you 
first go to Court." (Before Dec. 1965) 
"If you cannot afford to retain a lawyer privately, here is a telephone 
number by which you may call a volunteer attorney to represent you 
here at the police station." (From Dec. 1965 to July 1966) 
"If you cannot afford a lawyer privately, you have the right to have a 
lawyer appointed free of charge to represent you here at the police sta-
tion." [Note if question is asked hypothetically] (From July 1 to present) 
ASK ONLY THOSE WARNED BY THE POLICE AND PROBE ATTI-
TUDE IN RELATION TO EACH RIGHT. 
What did you feel about the way the police told you of your rights? 
How had you learned about these rights? 
Were there any other rights that you thought that you deserved but 
which the police did not mention? 
What did you do when (or would you do if) the police said you didn't 
have to talk with them, or answer their questions? 
Did you ever say that you did not want to talk? 
What did the police do when you said you did not want to talk? 
What did you do when (or would you do if) they said you could call a 
lawyer, friend, or relative? 
How many calls were you allowed to make? 
Why did you (or would you) call that person? 
Tell me about what you and that person you called (or would call) talked 
(or would talk) about on the telephone. 
IF THE RESPONDENT INDICATES THAT HE CALLED SOMEONE, 
ASK •••• 
Did (the person called) come down to the police station? 
IF THE ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION IS "YES," THEN 
ASK .••• 
What happened after he got there? (Interviewer: Probe to determine 
specifics of action, i.e., did police allow you to see him during question, 
etc.) 
If you were (or had been) told you had a right to a lawyer, what did you 
do (or would you have done)? 
If you said (or would have said) you wanted a lawyer, what did (or 
would) the police do? 
IF THE PERSON THE DEFENDANT CALLED DID NOT COME 
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Why didn't ---- come? 
IF THE RESPONDENT INDICATED (Col. 61) THAT HE DID NOT 
CALL A LAWYER, THEN ASK: 
Would you have liked to talk to a lawyer? 
IF THE RESPONSE TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION IS "YES," THEN 
ASK: 
What do you think he could have done? 
IF THE DEFENDANT DID NOT WANT TO TALK TO A LAWYER, 
ASK ••.•• 
Why not? 
INTERVIE'WER: CODE YOURSELF, LATER 
How many different lawyers did the defendant have? 
• STATION HOUSE CALLS ONLY• 
How soon after you were arrested did your appointed attorney visit you 
(at the police station)? 
What did this lawyer tell you to do (advice)? 
Did you follow bis advice? 
What services, if any, did the attorney render? 
(Write down all services) 
How much time did the lawyer spend with you? 
Do you think that this attorney was helpful to you? If no, why? 
APPENDIX. D 
The Profile of the Defendants in the Interview Sample 
The overwhelming majority of the 260 defendants in our interview sample are male 
Negroes: 93 per cent are males, 90 per cent are Negroes, 88 per cent are male Negroes. 
The group is generally young: approximately three quarters fall between the ages of 
19 and 34, the modal range being 20-24. 
The defendants also tend to be poor: approximately 45 per cent have annual in-
comes of $4,000 or less, and 16 per cent have annual incomes of under $2,000.a Their 
occupational levels, as well as their occupational skills, are low: 17 per cent are un-
employed; 51 per cent are either laborers, operatives, or in service jobs; 42 per cent 
have bad no vocational training whatsoever. 
The defendants' educational status is also relatively low: 76 per cent did not 
complete high school, and 22 per cent received eight years or less of schooling. 
Despite the fact that 72 per cent of the sample is listed as presently unmarried, 
family size is large, averaging 4.1 persons per household. Housing conditions are 
generally poor with the average number of persons per room as .997, which is just 
slightly below the United States Census figure of 1.01 persons per room as signifying 
overcrowding.b 
Because of the large number of Negroes in the sample, it was anticipated that the 
group would primarily be of the Baptist religion, and while indeed Baptists occur with 
the greatest frequency (34 per cent), there is a surprising number of Catholics (27 per 
cent). Another 10 per cent of the sample were Black Muslims, and 14 per cent reported 
no religious affiliations. Approximately 67 per cent reported themselves to be either 
"very" or "fairly" religious, 13 per cent said that they were "a little" religious, 9 per 
a This income level is comparable to the general income of Negroes in the District 
of Columbia in 1960: 43 per cent of the Negro households had annual incomes of $4,000 
or less then. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING FOR VIRGINIA 
AND MARYLAND TRACTS, table P4, at 137 (1960). There is indication that the percentage 
of defendants with incomes of $4,000 or less in our sample may well have been higher 
if the 17 per cent who had refused to answer this question or who had incomes so 
marginal and fragmented as to make construction of their annual incomes impossible 
had in fact responded to the question. 
b Id., table HI, at 149. 
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cent reported no religious feelings, and 7 per cent felt that they were not religious 
enough. 
As has been noted by other observers,c one of the more accurate criteria for deter-
mining class membership is the number of voluntary affiliations, with the middle class 
tending toward many and diverse organizational affiliations and the lower class tend-
ing toward few and more restricted affiliations. The evidence of the interview data 
corroborates the general lower socioeconomic status of the sample: only 3 per cent 
belong to political parties; 3 per cent are Parent-Teacher Association members; 2 per 
cent belong to civil rights organizations; 2 per cent belong to professional groups; 2 
per cent belong to fraternal organizations; and the largest number, 7 per cent, belong 
to informal clubs.d 
Over half of the sample (57 per cent) are residents of the District of Columbia, 
while close to a third come from the South. In addition, the defendants have had a 
reasonably low degree of geographic mobility: 56 per cent have always lived in the 
District; 15 per cent have lived here nine years or less; only 6 per cent have lived here 
two years or less.e 
Finally, most of the crimes committed by defendant sample are serious: 56 per cent 
are violent felonies; 39 per cent, nonviolent felonies; and only 5 per cent, misdemeanors. 
That the sample represents a serious criminal population is further evidenced by the 
fact that 24 per cent had been arrested nine or more times, with the median lying 
between seven and eight arrests. Moreover, 72 per cent of the defendants had friends 
who at one time or another had been arrested. 
The following table is a comparative tabulation of the frequency distribution of 
demographic characteristics of all defendants, pre-Miranda defendants, and post-
Miranda defendants, and post-Miranda defendants with and without counsel. 
c See, e.g., Reisman, Class, Leisure, and Social Participation, 19 AM. Soc. REv. 
76 (1956); Wright &: Hyman, Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: 
Evidence from National Sample Surveys, 23 AM. Soc. REv. 284 (1958). 
d As defined here, informal clubs refers to such loosely structured organizations as 
a once-weekly card-playing group or a few men who bowl together regularly. 
e This fact tends to argue against any theory of relationship between criminality 
and broad geographic mobility. In the present study, however, we did not have an 
opportunity to explore the relationship of criminality to local or neighborhood 
mobility. For a discussion of this relationship, see Robins &: O'Neal, Mortality, Mobility 
and Crime: Problem Children Thirty Years Later, 23 AM. Soc. REv. 162 (1958). 
TABLE D-1 
-Frequency Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of Various Defendant Samples (in percentages) ~ 0 (X) 
Post-Miranda Post-Miranda 
Total Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants Defendants 
Defendants Defendants Defendants Without Counsel With Counsel 
Characteristic (N =260) (N = 175) (N =85) (N =56) (N =29) 
Sex 
Male 93 93 93 91 97 
Female 7 7 7 9 3 
Race ~ White 10 9 13 18 3 




Age ~ ~ 
15-19 13 11 16 13 24 l:""I 20-24 33 34 33 25 48 ~ 
25-29 19 20 18 20 14 ~ 
30-34 15 15 14 20 3 ~ 35-39 7 6 9 9 10 C1' 
40-49 11 12 8 12 0 ~ .... 
50 and over 2 2 1 2 0 C1' ~ 
Birthplace 
D.C. 57 62 48 45 55 
Va. 5 6 4 5 0 
Md. 3 3 1 2 0 
Other South 24 20 31 32 28 
Other 8e Foreign 11 9 16 16 17 
Years in D.C. ~ 
Life 56 61 45 41 52 :-"' 
30 yrs. or more 3 4 1 2 0 Ol f:l 
20-29 yrs. 12 10 16 25 0 .... ..,. 
~ 
TABLE D-1 (continued) e Post-Miranda Post-Miranda 
.... 
Total Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants Defendants u:, 0> 
Defendants Defendants Defendants Without Counsel With Counsel .£:l 
Characteristic (N =260) (N = 175) (N= 85) (N=56) (N =29) 
Years in D.C., (cont.) 
10-19 yrs. 14 10 21 16 31 ~ 5- 9 yrs. 5 5 5 0 14 
3- 4 yrs. 4 3 5 5 3 ~ 
~ 1- 2 yrs. 2 2 2 4 0  
1 yr. 8e under 4 4 5 7 0 ~ ~ 
Education ;:! ..... 




Some H.S. 56 55 56 48 72 C 
Grad. H.S. 17 16 19 25 7 
;3 
Some college or better 6 6 5 5 3 .Q. 
Occupation ~ 
Prof./Mgr. 5 5 5 5 3 ~-Clerical/sales 5 5 6 5 7 ;:! 
Craft/Op. 25 25 24 24 24 ~ Service 17 18 17 16 17 
Military 1 2 0 0 0 ... ;:! 
Student I 1 2 4 0 ~ Retired 1 1 0 0 0 
Household 2 1 4 4 3 ~ 
Laborer 22 25 17 18 14 
Unemployed 17 14 23 20 28 
Other 2 2 2 2 3 
Marital Status 
Married 28 30 24 27 17 
Single 49 48 49 38 69 ..... 
Widowed 3 3 5 7 0 ~ 0 
c.o 
..... 
TABLE D-1 (continued) ~ 
..... 
Post-Miranda Post-Miranda 0 
Total Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants Defendants 
Defendants Defendants Defendants Without Counsel With Counsel 
Characteristic (N =260) (N = 175) (N =85) (N =56) (N =29) 
Marital Status (cont.) 
Divorced 4 4 5 5 3 
Separated 16 15 18 22 10 
Household Composition 
~ Lives alone 1 1 0 0 0 .... 
With 1 other 12 13 12 10 17 g. 
With 2 others 15 14 19 18 21 i' With 3 others 15 13 18 16 21 
With 4 others 15 16 13 16 21 ~ 
With 5 others 13 13 13 13 7 t"'i 
With 6 others 9 IO 7 7 0 I::) 
With 7 others 5 5 4 5 0 ~ 
With 8 others 6 6 5 4 7 ::i:i 
With 9 others 5 7 2 2 3 ~ ~ 
With 10 or more 4 2 7 9 ll .... ~ 
~ 
Annual Income 
Under $1,000 9 8 12 9 17 
$ 1,000-$ 1,999 7 6 7 5 10 
$ 2,000-$ 3,999 29 30 28 27 31 
$ 4,000-$ 5,999 23 24 21 20 24 
$ 6,000-$ 7,999 8 8 8 9 7 
$ 8,000-$ 9,999 2 2 2 4 0 ] $10,000-$14,999 ll 4 1 2 0 
$15,000 or more 1 1 1 2 0 0, 
No response 17 16 19 23 10 ~ 
-"" ~ 
TABLE D-1 (continued) E:: 
Post-Miranda Post-Miranda ~ 
-Total Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants Defendants (0 0> 
Defendants Defendants Defendants Without Counsel With Counsel ~ 
Characteristic (N=260) (N = 175) (N =85) (N =56) (N =29) 
Housing by Auspices 
Private 90 91 89 91 86 ~ 
Public 10 9 11 9 14 ~ 
Number of Rooms ~ 
l 15 13 19 14 28 ~ 
2 14 13 14 11 21 ~ ~ 
3 14 13 15 14 17 i:i" 
4 17 19 12 11 14 .... .... 
5 10 9 13 18 3 C ~ 
6 13 13 12 14 7 ~ 7 7 8 4 5 0 
8-12 9 9 9 11 7 ~ 13 or more 2 2 2 2 3 ... 
Rent Per Month ~ ~ 
Free 5 6 5 7 0 !} 
Under $40 l I 2 2 3 
~-$ 40-$ 79 33 32 35 36 34 
$ 80-$ 99 20 21 20 20 21 ~ $100-$129 15 16 13 13 14 0 $130-$159 5 5 4 4 3 
$160-$199 l I 0 0 0 
$200-$299 l l I 2 0 
$300- and over I l 0 0 0 
No response 18 18 20 18 24 
Religion 
..... 
Baptist 34 33 36 35 39 ~ 
..... 
..... 
TABLE D-1 (continued) I-' t,j:>. 
Post-Miranda Post-Miranda I-' N) 
Total Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants Defendants 
Defendants Defendants Defendants Without Counsel With Counsel 
Characteristic (N =260) (N = 175) (N =85) (N =56) (N =29) 
Religion (cont.) 
Roman Catholic 27 28 26 20 35 
Methodist 5 6 2 2 3 
Presbyterian l 2 0 0 0 
Episcopalian 2 l 2 2 3 
Lutheran l 0 2 4 0 ~ Seventh Day Adv. l l 0 0 0 .... 
Jewish I l 2 4 0 s. 
Jehovah's Witnes, l 0 2 4 0 ac;· 
"Storefront" I l 2 4 0 ~ ~ 
Black Muslim 10 12 7 9 3 l"'-i Unitarian 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 
Holiness I l 2 4 0 ~ 
None 14 14 13 14 13 
::z:i 
Church Attendance <:1> ~ 
Weekly 21 24 15 18 10 .... <:1> 
Twice monthly 14 13 16 14 21 ~ 
Once monthly 8 9 7 4 14 
5, 6 times yearly 8 8 8 7 10 
Holidays only 4 3 6 5 7 
Rarely, never 40 38 44 46 38 
No response 5 5 4 6 0 
Religious Feelings 
1 Very 20 18 25 32 10 Fair 47 46 47 39 62 
A little 13 13 13 11 17 Ol R' 
Not enough 7 9 5 5 3 -"° 
"" ~
TABLE D-1 (continued) ~ 
Post-Miranda Post-Miranda -el 
... 
Total Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants Defendants tO 0, 
Defendants Defendants Defendants Without Counsel With Counsel ~ 
Characteristic (N=260) (N = 175) (N =85) (N=56) (N =29) 
Religious Feelings (cont.) 
Not religious 9 10 8 11 3 l No response 3 3 2 2 3 Membership in Voluntary 
-Organizations C1) ~ Church Clubs 6 5 7 7 7 C1) 
Church Office holders 5 4 6 7 3 ~ 
.... 
Labor Union 9 10 7 7 7 ~ .... 
Political Party 3 4 2 4 0 .... C 
Civil Rights Groups 2 3 0 0 0 ~ 
Fraternal Organizations 2 3 0 0 0 ~ Informal clubs 7 7 7 5 10 
PTA 3 4 2 4 0 ~ 
Professional Organizations 2 1 2 4 0 
~-
Previous Arrests ~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 1 10 10 11 13 7 
2 18 14 26 30 17 ~-
3 16 16 18 18 17 ~ 4 10 11 8 2 21 
5 10 11 9 4 21 0 
6 6 6 6 5 7 
7 2 2 2 2 0 
8 3 4 1 0 3 
9 & over 24 27 20 27 7 
Friends Arrested 
One or more 72 73 69 68 72 ..... 
None 28 27 31 32 28 ~ 
..... 
C)!) 
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APPENDIX E 
Supplementary Tabular Data 
[Vol. 66:1347 
Since our audience is primarily lawyers, we have deliberately avoided using sta-
tistical tests for the significance of our data. Probaby the most common test and 
one most understandable, is the "chi-square test."a In many of our tables, because 
of the frequency of large numbers of categories in which we present our data (cells) 
and because of the frequency in which small numbers appear in many of those 
categories (small cell size), our data do not lend themselves to meaningful chi-square 
analysis. On the other hand, had we selected the less complicated tables for chi-square 
analysis, we would have run the risk of suggesting distortion of the statistical signifi-
cance by such selective usage even though chi-square would have been easily applicable 
in those instances. 
We also rejected other tests of significance, such as the "T-test"b or the "Fischer 
exact probability test,"c because we believed the description and definition of these 
tests and their applicability would have made our presentation too complicated. In 
view of our audience, the marginal value of these tests would not have offset the 
concomitant confusion engendered. 
At the same time, we must stress that, although statistical tests of significance are 
avoided, there nevertheless is a consistency of direction to our data which supports 
our inferences. The following tables supplement and support the textual tables. 
a See Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 
1532, 1550-51 n.82, 1639 (1967). 
b See UNDERWOOD, DUNCAN, TAYLOR, &: CorroN, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 127 (1954). 
c See SIEGEL, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS 96-104 (1956). 
TABLE E-1 
Statements Given by the Different Defendant Groupsa 
Post-Miranda Defendants Volunteer 
Pre- Attorney 
Miranda Without With Defen-
Defendantsb Total Counsel Counsel dantsc 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Statements 75 43 34 40 22 39 12 41 128 49 
No Statements 99 57 51 60 34 61 17 59 133 51 
Total 174 100 85 100 56 100 29 100 261 100 
a Data Sources: Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Not ascertained: 1. 
c Not ascertained: 65. 
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TABLE E-2 
Class of Crime by Statements Given by Volunteer Attorney Defendantsa 
Statements No Statementsc 
Crimesb No. % No. 
Homicided 4 57 3 
Robberyc 16 35 30 
Sex Offenses! 3 33 6 
Assaultt 40 57 30 
Larceny-Theft 21 62 13 
Auto Theft 8 80 2 
Housebreaking 15 58 11 
White Collarh 2 
Drug Offenses 7 50 7 
Weaponsl 2 25 6 
All OthersJ 6 25 18 
Undetermined 6 55 5 
Total 128 49 133 
11 Data Source: Volunteer Attorney Defendants. 
b For the total number of defendants in each crime category, see table 1 supra. 
c Not ascertained: 65. 
d Includes murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. 
e Includes robbery and attempted robbery. 
f Includes rape, attempted rape, sodomy, and carnal knowledge. 
" Includes aggravated and simple assault. 
h Includes counterfeiting, embezzlement, forgery, and fraud. 
1 Includes carrying and possession. 
j Includes all other crimes except common traffic offenses. 
TABLE E-3 (I) 
Frequency Distribution of Crimes Charged to Defendants Listed 





Sex Offenses 55 
Assaults 293 
Larceny-Theft 139 
Auto Theft 75 
Housebreaking 134 
White Collar 21 
Drug Offenses 89 
Weapons 84 
Sub Total 1,110 
All Others 130 
Undetermined 22 
Total 1,262 
a Data source: Telephone Log Records. 






























TABLE E-3 (2) 
Crimes Charged to Defendants Listed in Telephone Log Records as Related 
to Total Arrests in D.C. in Fiscal 1967 
Defendant 
Requests 
No. of No. of as% of 
Defendant Total Total 
Crimesa Requestsb Arrestsc Arrests 
Homicide 31 185 17 
Robbery 189 2,005 9 
Sex Offenses 55 494 11 
Assaults 293 3,805 8 
Larceny-Theft 139 3,418 4 
Auto Theft 75 1,183 6 
Housebreaking 134 2,065 6 
White Collar 21 592 4 
Drug Offenses 89 553 16 
Weapons 84 1,130 7 
Subtotal 1,110 15,430 7 
All Others 130 58,062 •d 
Undetermined 22 
Total 1,262 73,492 2 
a Definitions of Crimes are contained in Table E-2, supra. 
b Data source: Telephone Log Records. 
c Data source: D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Official Arrest Statistics for 
fiscal year 1967, on file at the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure. 
d Percentage is too insignificant for computation. 
TABLE E-4 
Warnings of Rights Given to Different Defendant Groupsa 
Pre- Post-Miranda Defendants Volunteer 
Miranda Without With Attorney 
Defendantsb Total Counsel Counsel Defendantsc 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Warningsd 90 52 64 75 36 64 28 97 282 92 
No Warningse 84 48 21 25 20 36 l 3 26 8 
Total 174 100 85 100 56 100 29 100 308 100 
a Data Sources: Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Not ascertained: I. 
c Not ascertained: 18. 
d Includes complete and partial warnings. 
e Includes those who were so intoxicated or in narcotic withdrawal as not to re-
member receiving the warnings, as well as those who received no warnings. 
TABLE E-5 
Number of Times Post-Miranda Defendants Given W arningsa 
Post-Miranda Defendants 
Total Without Counsel With Counsel 
No. % No. % No. % 
0 21 25 20 36 l 3 
l 43 51 25 44 18 62 
2 14 16 8 14 6 21 
3+ 7 8 3 6 4 14 
Total 85 100 56 100 29 100 
aData source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
TABLE E-6 
Comparison of Defendant Claims and Police Admissions of Interrogation of Volunteer Attorney Defendants by Crime Chargeda 
Defendant Claimsc Police Admissionsd 
Interrogation No Interrogation Interrogation No Interrogation 
Crimcsb No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Homicide 6 75 2 25 3 43 4 57 
Robbery 14 30 32 70 5 11 39 89 
Sex Offenses 1 IO 9 90 
- -
8 100 
Assaults 44 58 32 42 19 25 56 75 
Larceny-Theft 25 58 18 42 9 33 31 67 
Auto Theft 9 64 5 36 5 38 8 72 
Housebreaking 17 52 16 48 5 16 26 84 
White Collar 
- -
2 100 I 33 2 67 
Drug Offenses 8 67 4 33 9 24 3 76 
Weapons 3 33 6 67 2 22 7 78 
All Others 12 41 17 59 4 13 26 87 
Undetermined 9 75 3 25 7 64 4 36 
Total 148 50 146 50 69 75 214 25 
n Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Definition of crimes arc contained in Table E-2, supra. 
c Not ascertained: 32. 




























Rights Warnings Given to Interrogated and Noninterrogated Defendantsn 
Pre-Miranda Post-Miranda Defendants 
Defendantsb Total Without Counsel With Counsel 
No No No No 
Interro. Interro. Interro. Interro. Interro. Interro. Interro. Interro. 
--- --- ---
--- ---
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Warnings 44 45 46 60 29 71 35 79 15 58 21 70 14 93 14 100 
No Warnings 53 55 31 40 12 29 9 21 11 42 9 30 1 7 - -
Total 97 100 77 100 41 100 44 100 26 100 30 100 15 100 14 100 
n Data sources: Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Not ascertained: 1. 
c Not ascertained: 32. 






No. % No. % 
133 90 136 93 
14 10 10 7 


























Interrogation of Difjerent Defendant Groups by Whether Statements Givena 
Pre-Miranda 
Post-Miranda Defendants 
Defcndantsb Total Without Counsel With Counsel 
Stat. No Stat. Stat. No Stat. Stat. No Stat. Stat. No Stat, 
--- --- --- --- --- ---No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Interrogation 68 91 29 29 21 62 20 39 13 59 13 38 8 67 7 41 
No Interrbga-
tion 7 9 70 71 13 38 31 61 9 41 21 62 4 33 10 59 
Total 75 100 99 100 34 100 51 100 22 100 34 100 12 100 17 100 
a Data sources: Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Not ascertained: 1. 
c Not ascertained: 65. 
d Not ascertained: 2. 
o Not ascertained: 63, 
Volunteer Attorney 
Defcndantsc 
Stat. No Stat, 
-- ---No. % No. % 
110 87 28 40 
16 13 42 60 































Results of Interrogation by Whether Defendants Warnedn 
Post-Miranda Defendants 
Pre-Miranda Defendantsb Totalc Without Counseld 
No No No 
Statement Statement Statement Statement Statement Statement 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Warnings 24 35 20 69 15 71 14 70 7 54 8 62 
No Warnings 44 65 9 31 6 29 6 30 6 46 5 38 
Total 68 100 29 100 21 100 20 100 13 100 13 100 
n Data sources: Defendant Interview Schedules and Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Not interrogated: 78, 
c Not interrogated: 44. 
d Not interrogated: 30. 
e Not interrogated: 14. 




No. % No. % 
8 100 6 86 
- -
1 14 





No, % No. % 
97 89 25 93 
12 11 2 7 
























Understanding of Different Rights by Pre- and Post-Miranda Defendantsa 
Post-Miranda Defendants 
Pre-Miranda Defendants Total Without Counsel 
Under. Misunder. Under. Misunder. Under. Misunder. 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Silence 144 82 31 18 72 85 13 15 48 86 8 14 
Presence of Counsel 142 81 33 19 70 82 15 18 45 80 11 20 
Appointed Counsel 112 64 63 36 67 76 18 24 43 77 13 23 
a Data source: Defendant Interview Schedules. 
With Counsel 
Under. Misunder • 
---No. % No. % 
24 83 5 17 
25 86 4 14 
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TABLE E-11 
Number of Attorneys Contacted for Each Telephone Request To Obtain Volunteer 
Attorneys in Six-Month Intervalsa 
Attorneys 
1st Six Months 2nd Six Months 
Contacted No. % No. % 
I 672 91 259 83 
2 45 6 33 11 
3 16 2 6 2 
4+ 4 I 12 4 
Totalb 737 100 310 100 
a Data source: Telephone Log Records. 
b Not ascertained for 1st six months: 67; not ascertained for 2nd six months: 41; 
not designated by month or year: 2. 
TABLE E-12 
Time-Intervals for Attorney Involvement, Between Arrest, Assignment, 




(1) Between Arrest Attorney and 
and Attorney Assignment of 
Assignment:a an Attorneyb 
Cumu- Cumu-
Time lative lative 
Interval No. % % No. % % 
0- 5min. 14 5 5 550 59 59 
5-15min. 27 9 14 170 18 77 
15-30 min. 58 20 34 75 8 85 
½· I hour 79 28 62 66 7 92 
1- 2hours 60 21 83 36 4 96 
2+hours 50 17 100 40 4 100 
Total 288c 100 937d 100 
a Data source: Volunteer Attorney Reports. 
b Data source: Telephone Log Records. 









No. % % 
248 80 80 
20 6 86 
15 5 91 
21 7 98 
4 1 99 
2 1 100 
310e 100 
d Attorney not assigned or assignment not ascertained: 184; time interval not as-
certained: 36. 
e Not ascertained: 16. 
